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THE HOUSE I LIVE IN
A Study of Housing for Minorities
Milton L. McGhee
Ann Fagan Ginger'
"The house I live in-that's America to me!"
If the ballad singer is right, America is a dingy, overcrowded slum to
millions of its citizens. To almost everyone it is a segregated society
where your neighbor must be the same color you are. Judged by its
housing, America is a country where the color of your skin matters
more than the color of your money, for today one out of every six Amer-
icans is unable to live where he wishes to live because of racial or religious
discrimination.' According to the United States Commission on Civil
Rights:
Most of these Americans, regardless of their educational, economic, or
professional accomplishments, have no alternative but to live in used
dwellings originally occupied by white Americans who have a free choice
of housing, new or old. Housing thus seems to be the one commodity in
the American market that is not freely available on equal terms to every-
one who can afford to pay.... The results can be seen in high rates of
disease, fire, juvenile delinquency, crime and social demoralization among
those forced to live in such conditions. A nation dedicated to respect for
the human dignity of every individual should not permit such conditions
to continue. 2
This problem exists in every section of the country, and is acute
in every urban center; 3 it is now moving into the suburbs.4  With it
inevitably goes its undemocratic concomitant-segregated public schools. 5
f See contributors' section, masthead, p. 306, for biographical data.
1 McEntire, Residence and Race (1960).
2 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, With Liberty and Justice For All 180 (1959). This is a
summary of the full Report of the U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights issued Sept. 9, 1959.
The American minority groups which have traditionally had difficulty in securing
housing on a nondiscriminatory basis include: Negroes, Jews, Puerto Ricans, Mexican-
Americans, Chinese-Americans, Japanese-Americans. It has become customary to refer to
these groups generally as "nonwhite." This is the term used by the U.S. Commission and
other sources quoted herein, and will be repeated when necessary. Many find this term
unacceptable since it implies that "white" is the norm and all who are not white are
lacking something. Since the largest American minority group is the Negro group, it will
occasionally be used to indicate all of the other groups mentioned above.
3 For examples of housing discrimination against Negroes see, e.g., 1 Hearings Before the
U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights: Housing, against Jews, Id. at 362, 395-96; against Puerto
Ricans, at 301; Id. at 386-87, 391 (all re New York City). Opposition to Chinese consul
general moving to San Mateo, California, reported in S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 15, 1960, p. 1.
4 See, e.g., speech by Eugene C. Lee to Int'l City Managers' Ass'n, S.F. Chronicle, Oct.
18, 1960.
5 See, e.g., 1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 824 (Chicago); In the Matter of Skipwith, 14
Misc. 2d 325, 180 N.Y.S.2d 852 (N.Y. City Ct. 1958); Advisory Committee of Citizens,
"Interracial Problems and Their Effect on Education in the Public Schools of Berkeley,
California," Report to the Board of Education, Oct. 19, 1959, discussed infra at note 262.
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This study of housing for American minority groups is intended as a
guide to federal, state, city and private approaches to the problem.
Existing legislation will be analyzed. The effects of executive action and
inaction will be assessed. Recent court decisions will be discussed.
Since private citizens are becoming increasingly active in this field-using
a variety of means to achieve various ends-this study will set forth
some of the classic examples of individual and community action in the
face of inadequate housing for minority groups.
I. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION APPROACHES TO SEGREGATION IN HOUSING
AND THEm CONSTITUTIONALITY
Federal Aid to Housing
For the past twenty-five years the federal government has played a
major role in the housing industry. Today the Housing and Home
Finance Agency (HHFA) encompasses five constituents: Public Housing
Administration (PHA), Urban Renewal Administration (URA), Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA) and Voluntary Home Mortgage Credit Program (VHMC).
In addition, the Veterans' Administration (VA) affects the housing field
through its insurance of housing loans to veterans.
PHA administers the public low-rent housing program by providing
development loans and annual subsidies to local communities for develop-
ing and operating projects for low-income families. The program is
locally owned and administered. Today there are more than 2,000
federally-aided projects, with 451,000 units8 managed by 1,000 local
authorities housing almost two million people in 42 states.7
URA authorizes advances to local communities for planning Title I
projects,8 giving loans and grants up to two-thirds of the cost of pur-
chasing and clearing land for rehabilitation of blighted urban areas. The
projects are carried out by local public agencies under powers granted
by state and local enabling laws. Eight hundred and seventy-seven
localities have adopted workable programs, and 645 Title I projects are
being carried out in 386 localities. Already some $1.3 billion has been
provided for these projects by the federal government.
FHA and VA administer the federal home mortgage loan insurance
programs. Since 1935, FHA has written mortgage insurance on more
than five million homes and on multifamily rental and cooperative
6 A unit consists of an apartment regardless of the number of rooms.
7 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 172-73; 2 Hearings, supra note 3, at
4, 62.8 Housing Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 416, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1450-62 (1958), as amended.
9 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 173-75; 2 Hearings, supra note 3, at 4.
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housing units of 800,000 families. Property improvement loans have
been approved for more than 22 million homeowners."°
FNMA provides supplementary assistance for FHA-insured and
VA-guaranteed home mortgages, working directly with private lending
institutions. FNMA also buys certain loans at the determination of
Congress or the President to make financing available in new and un-
proved fields."
The Voluntary Home Mortgage Credit Program, established in 1954,
finds mortgage lenders for qualified minority group home buyers in any
area unable to get mortgage credit from local sources. The HHFA
administrator serves as chairman and HHFA provides a small staff
and administrative assistance. In its first four and a half years, more than
8,000 loans totalling $80 million were secured through this program,
which has also arranged the financing of three project loans covering
546 open-occupancy rental units."2
The federal government causes new housing units to be built, purchased,
or rented, and older units to be renovated. It also assists in the razing of
large urban areas each time a new housing project (or highway) is
built. Since the number of housing units built never equals the number
of overcrowded slums formerly on the site, and since few of the new units
are available to the former inhabitants, the housing crisis is heightened by
every effort to alleviate it.13
Obviously, the policies of the federal government in housing have
affected every aspect of this industry. Urban Renewal Administration
must approve the razing of every area selected for Title I redevelop-
ment, and must therefore set criteria for judging substandard housing.
The federal government, through the Public Housing Administration,
decides what constitutes adequate housing for low-income families. The
federal government sets standards builders must meet in order to get
VA or FHA mortgage insurance.
What has been the policy of the federal government toward equality in
housing opportunity, regardless of race or color or national origin?
10 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 171-72; 2 Hearings, supra note 3, at
3-4.
11 2 Hearings, supra note 3, at 4-5.
12 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 175-76.
13 See, e.g., Abrams, "U.S. Housing: A New Program," at 1 Hearings, supra note 3, at
171-81; housing shortage in Chicago: Id. at 715, 716, 727, 868-69; S.F. Chronicle, May 9,
1960, p. 14. See inventory by N.Y. Real Estate Commissioner on 19,089 families to be
relocated in N.Y.C. in 10-month period due to public improvements. N.Y. Times, July 12,
1960, p. 36, col. 1. Of all nonwhite residents of Providence, RI., 48.2% have been displaced
by slum clearance, highway and public school projects--1949-1960; 5.9% of white
residents have also been displaced. Kellam, Council Highlights (R.I. State Council of
Churches, 2 Stimson Ave., Providence, March 1960). For a compendium on the operational
aspects of all federal housing programs, see Haar, Federal Credit and Private Housing
(1960).
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Toward racial segregation and racial restrictive covenants? Toward open
occupancy?
Constitutional, Executive and Legislative Policies
The United States Constitution does not mention the right to buy, rent
or occupy housing without discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color
or national origin.14 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 (enacted while the
fourteenth amendment was also under consideration by Congress), led
to section 1982 of title 42, which remains the only federal statute related
to discrimination in housing:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
Under this statute and the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court
in Buchanan v. Warley'5 invalidated a city ordinance zoning residential
areas along racial lines. And in the Restrictive Covenant cases' the
Court outlawed the enforcement of racial restrictive covenants by state
courts, but this has not covered the field.
The primary problem on the federal level today is the lack of a
positive policy against racial discrimination in the expenditure of federal
funds for construction of housing accommodations. In the Housing Act
of 1949,'7 Congress declared the national goal to be "a decent home
and a suitable living environment for every American family." But
Congress has consistently refused to include in the federal housing
program positive interdictions against discriminatory practices based on
race, religion or national origin,'8 and standards for determining the
existence of such practices. In the absence of such standards, administra-
tors often defer to local pressures, defeating the plan for a uniform
national housing program and frequently discriminating against the very
people for whose benefit the program was instituted. Such inaction, of
course, is not limited to the federal program; many states and localities
have followed a similar course.
In 1957 Congress passed the first national civil rights measure enacted
since 1875, setting up a fact-finding commission in the executive branch. 19
The Civil Rights Commission was directed inter alia to:
study and collect information concerning legal developments constituting
a denial of equal protection of the laws under the Constitution; and
14 The fourteenth amendment prohibits states from denying to any citizen the equal
protection of the laws and the fifth amendment due process clause has been held to
serve the same purpose. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
15 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
16 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
17 63 Stat. 416 (1949), 42 U.S.C. 1441 (1958).
18 See, e.g., Housing Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 654-88.
19 71 Stat. 634-38 (1957).
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appraise the laws and policies of the Federal Government with respect to
equal protection of the laws under the Constitution.20
Pursuant to this directive, the Commission has studied discriminatory
practices in housing, holding extensive hearings in three cities in 1959 in
preparation of its first report, and additional hearings in 1960.21
In its report the Commission documented present practices in the
housing field, sharply pointing up the problem that has been brought
about in large part by the inaction of the federal government and of
many state and local governmental bodies. The reason for concern about
federal action had been spelled out in great detail by the Commission on
Race and Housing, a private research group, in its 1958 report:
The policies and actions of government agencies and public officials
must be counted among the principal influences sustaining racial segrega-
tion in housing. As the United Nations Subcommission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities has said, 'The most serious
forms of discrimination are those embodied in laws and regulations . ..
and those practiced by authorities and public officials.'....
The other indirect Federal support of segregation has been the moral
sanction given to the racial discrimination practices of private business.
As Myrdal has said, 'It is one thing when private tenants, property
owners, and financial institutions maintain and extend patterns of racial
segregation in housing. It is quite another matter when a Federal agency
chooses to side with the segregationists.' Government, as an expression of
the public will, is one of the sources of moral as well as legal authority.
If the government sees nothing wrong in racial discrimination, how can
private persons be censured for practicing it? In some fields, notably the
armed forces, the government has actively moved to abolish segregation.
In the housing field, the Federal government, in recent years, has with-
drawn from any explicit endorsement of housing segregation. Federal
agencies, however, aside from verbal pronouncements for equality, con-
tinue to tolerate the discriminatory practices of those who distribute
Federal benefits.22
While President Eisenhower's policy, set forth before the Commission
on Civil Rights made its first report, was to materially strengthen and
augment the "administrative policies governing the operation of the
several housing agencies ... in order to assure equal opportunity for all
of our citizens to acquire, within their means, good and well-located
homes, ' 23 the President did not act upon the Commission's specific recoin-
20 Id. at § 104(a).
21 1959 hearings in New York City, Chicago and Atlanta; 1960 hearings in Los
Angeles and San Francisco.
22 Where Shall We Live 29-30, 32 (1958). Other studies prepared by the Commission
include McEntire, Residence and Race; Studies in Housing and Minority Groups (Glazer
ed.); Grier, Privately Developed Interracial Housing; Laurenti, Property Values and Race(1960); Rapkin, The Demand for Housing in Racially Mixed Areas (1960).
23 Quoted in U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 170; and see President's
Comm. on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights VIII-IX (1947).
[Vol. 46
MINORITY HOUSING
mendation that an Executive Order be issued "stating the constitutional
objective of equal opportunity in housing, directing all Federal agencies
to shape their policies and practices to make the maximum contribution
to the achievement of this goal .... ;;24
Witnesses before the Commission have also suggested that the Presi-
dent call a National Conference on racial problems, similar to the
National Conferences on Children and Youth and the proposed annual
conference of labor leaders and management recently instituted by the
President.
Public Housing Administration
There is no federal legislation concerning the racial occupancy of
public housing projects, but the housing statute does provide a preference
"to families which are to be displaced by any low-rent housing project
or by any public slum-clearance or redevelopment project" '25 and to
families having the greatest need. 26 The housing statute does not provide
assistance in the relocation of persons displaced by public housing proj-
ects under construction.
Under these vague provisions for occupant selection, there is unbridled
discretion permitting selection of tenants on a racial basis. The choice
of sites for new housing projects provides another method by which
segregated patterns in public housing accommodations may be accom-
plished and maintained. Sites are frequently chosen which are located
in areas exclusively or largely inhabited by certain racial or religious
minority groups. PHA, in cooperation with local housing authorities,
has approved construction of large numbers of high rise apartment houses
in the middle of segregated slum areas. This choice of sites, together
with the low maximum income qualifications for tenants, has resulted in
46 per cent Negro occupancy of the 2,000 PHA projects, only 428 of
which are racially integrated.
In the selection of tenants, the 1951 Public Housing Manual pro-
vides:
(1) Programs for the development of low-rent housing, in order to be
eligible for Public Housing Administration assistance, must reflect
equitable provisions for eligible families of all races determined on
the approximate volume of their respective needs for such housing.
(2) While the selection of tenants and the assigning of dwelling units are
primarily matters for local determination, urgency of need and the
preference prescribed in the Housing Act of 1949 are the basic statu-
tory standards for the selection of tenants.2 7
24 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 184.
25 63 Stat. 423 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g) (1958).
26 63 Stat. 423 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1415(8)(c) (1958).
27 § 102.1 (1951).
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Each local housing authority has established its own procedures for
filling vacancies. In the early period, most authorities in the North and
South maintained two separate lists of applicants for housing and chan-
neled Negro and other minority group applicants into one group of
projects and white applicants into another. When this practice was
challenged in the federal courts in the northern and western states, the
courts uniformly forbade the practice and issued permanent injunctions
against racial segregation of tenants by the housing authorities.28 And in
Banks v. Housing Authority29 a quota system of tenants, based on the
prevailing racial composition of the community, was invalidated. This
"benign quota system," as it has been termed,8 was held to be contrary
to the equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth amendment.
These judicial pronouncements have not eliminated the practice of
segregation by some northern and western public housing administrators.
just as the aftermath of the School Segregation cases3 has provided the
most graphic illustration of the pace at which even United States Supreme
Court decisions are sometimes effectuated, 2 1959 PHA figures show the
present composition of projects in seven of the cities involved in litiga-
tion, as follows:"
28 Detroit Housing Comm'n v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955); Davis v. St. Louis
Housing Authority, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 353 (Civil No. 8637 E.D. Mo., 1955); Ward v.
Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority, 1 Civ. Lib. Docket 28, 48, No. 630.3 (S.D.
Ohio 1955); Jones v. City of Hamtramck, 13 Munic. L.C.D. 76 (E.D. Mich. 1954);
Woodbridge v. Housing Authority, 18 Munic. L.J. 79 (D.C. Ill. 1953); Askew v. Benton
Harbor Housing Comm'n, 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 611 (Civil No. 2512, W.D. Mich. 1956).
29 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954).
30 Note, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515 (1959). See discussion at note 240 infra.
31 Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reargued, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
32 Out of 2834 bi-racial school districts in the seventeen southern and border states,
768 have adopted a policy of desegregation, while 2,066 remain completely segregated.
Southern School News, Oct. 1960, p. 1. A brief history of public school desegregation cases
since 1955 may be found in 18 Law. Guild Rev. 93, 96-97 (1958), 19 Law. Guild Rev.
91, 95 (1959). See also McKay, "The Repression of Civil Rights as an Aftermath of the
School Segregation Cases," 4 How. L.J. 9 (1958).
33 PHA maintains a careful record of the racial occupancy of its projects, under the
following categories:
0 Integrated, white and Negro (with or without other nonwhite)
1 Integrated, white and other nonwhite
2 Segregated within project, by building or site
4 No pattern (too few Negroes in a white project or too few whites in a
Negro project to constitute a pattern)
5 All nonwhite
6 All white (with or without Latin-American)
7 All Latin-American
PHA statistics in the text refer to Detroit, Benton Harbor, Hamtramck, Mich.; St.
Louis, Mo.; Columbus, Ohio; Evansville, Ind.; San Francisco, Cal. (See note 28 supra.)
Statistics Branch, PHA, HHFA, Low-Rent Project Directory iii, 18, 63, 70, 87, 51.
See generally Intergroup Relations Branch, PHA, HHFA, Trends Toward Open Occupancy
in Low-Rent Housing Programs of the Public Housing Administration, published periodi-
cally. After the Washington State Board Against Discrimination found that the Pasco
PHA project was using racial designations on housing application forms supplied by PHA,
the project officiais agreed to delete questions of race from all forms. Washington State
Board Newsletter, III, No. 8, Aug. 1959.
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10 all nonwhite projects containing 3,755 units
1 all white project containing 210 units
25 integrated projects containing 14,212 units3 4
Contrary to the favorable judicial relief uniformly granted in northern
and western states, in the border and southern states courts have
permitted discriminatory practices to continue despite challenges by
tenants or prospective tenants seeking housing accommodations without
regard to race or religion. The suits generally were disposed of on
procedural grounds3 5 or mooted by action of the local housing authority
before trial on the merits.3 6
All but one of these cases were brought against city housing agencies;
the United States was joined as a party defendant only in the unsuc-
cessful Savannah suit3
Today, almost two million Americans live in low-rent housing projects
built by cities with federal aid. June 1, 1960, 46 per cent of the
occupants of these projects were Negroes. But out of 2,000 projects,
only 428 were racially integrated.38 PHA now has 567 additional projects
"in development." 39 These projects will house 60,189 family units.
The plans for these projects, prepared by city housing agencies, have
been approved by PHA, and they provide for:
34 Plus one all Chinese-American project containing 234 units (San Francisco), and
one project with 172 units segregated within the project.
35 Watts v. Housing Authority, 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 107 (Civ. No. 7690, N.D. Ala.,
1956) (dismissed for misjoinder of parties plaintiff, homeowners and tenants to be removed
from proposed project site). See also Title I cases discussed in text at note 57 infra. And
see Heyward v. PHA, 135 F. Supp. 217 (S.D. Ga. 1955), 238 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1956),
aff'd sub nom. Cohen v. PHA, 257 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 928(1959). The case was dismissed for failure to prove Negro plaintiffs had applied for
admission to white projects under PHA system. of separate application lists for Negroes and
whites. The suit had first arisen in the District of Columbia, but was dismissed since the
local housing authority was not made a party. Heyward v. PHA, 214 F.2d 222 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
Of Birmingham's six projects, today three are for white occupants only and three solely
for nonwhite. Of Savannah's nine projects, today five are solely for whites and four
solely for nonwhites. Statistics Branch, PHA, supra note 33, at 2, 39.
30 Eleby v. City of Louisville Municipal Housing Authority, 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 815
(Civ. No. 3240, W.D. Ky., 1957), reaff'd, 3 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1216 (1958). The district
court in 1957 approved the PHA plan, effective within one year, under which all applicants
would be permitted to request occupancy in any project and PHA would decide where to
place each family, but not on the basis of race. Nor would PHA force anyone to live where
he did not choose to live. Of the nine projects in Louisville today, 2 are integrated, 4
are for nonwhites only, 2 are for whites only and I has no racial pattern. Statistics
Branch, PHA, op. cit. supra note 33, at 53.
37 None of the cases was heard by the Supreme Court.
38 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 173. A comparison of desegregation in
education and desegregation in PHA projects reveals that the percentage of desegregated
southern and border public schools (locally governed) is almost twice as high as the
percentage of desegregated public housing projects (federally assisted) scattered throughout
the country.
39 Intergroup Relations Fact Sheet, Summary of Information of Racial Importance in
Development Programs Reviewed 7/l/57--6/30/59: one-page chart.
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13,807 units exclusively for nonwhites
9,005 units exclusively for whites
37,377 units with non-discrimination by race
That is, 22,812 units, or 31 per cent of the total now in development,
will be segregated units. These segregated units are being built in eight
southern states; 40 in five border states (which have achieved integra-
tion in education to a considerable extent) ;41 and segregated units are
also in development in two northern states.42 It seems extraordinary for
a public agency to plan explicitly discriminatory housing in 1960 and to
publish its intentions to do so.
In its first report, the United States Commission on Civil Rights set
forth its findings concerning racial occupancy of PHA units, and
recommended:
• . . that the Public Housing Administration take affirmative action to
encourage the selection of sites on open land in good areas outside the
present centers of racial concentration. PHA should put the local housing
authorities on notice that their proposals will be evaluated in this light.
PHA should further encourage the construction of smaller projects that
fit better into residential neighborhoods, rather than large developments
of tall "high rise" apartments that set a special group apart in a community
of its own.4 3
However, the Commission's recommendation did not foreclose the
promotion by the federal government of new, segregated, publicly
financed low rent housing projects.4 4 To avoid this result Commissioner
Johnson carefully footnoted this suggestion:
I believe that equal opportunity to housing and freedom of choice in
housing can be promoted in many ways, but I do not believe that this goal
can be attained through so-called minority housing. Such housing merely
makes available to Negroes better 11ousing in new or existing ghettos and
does not give them the full range of choice enjoyed by most other Ameri-
can citizens. In no real sense can this be called equality of opportunity or
freedom of choice. 45
The reports of the United States Commission on Civil Rights and the
Commission on Race and Housing, as well as other testimony by
housing authorities, indicate five needed reforms:
1. To increase the number of PHA units.46
40 Ala., Fla., Ga., La., Miss., S.C., Tenn., Va.
41 Ark., Ky., Md., Mo., Texas.
42 555 units in Illinois; 362 in Pennsylvania, which state prohibits discrimination in
public housing propects and publicly assisted and urban renewal housing, by statute, see
chart infra at p. 225.
43 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 185.
44 Id. at 140.
45 Ibid.
46 It has not been uncommon for opponents of public housing to propose amendments
to housing bills denying use of federal funds for racially discriminatory housing. See, e.g.,
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2. To adopt and administer a clear nondiscriminatory policy in
all PHA units.'
3. To follow a nondiscriminatory policy of site selection for all
proposed PHA units by scattering many low rise apartments
throughout the metropolitan areas, instead of a few high rise
apartments which are sealed off from the rest of the community.
4. To encourage flexibility and creativity in public housing plan-
ning.48
5. To enact legislation providing financial and other relocation
assistance to families displaced by PHA projects.
Urban Renewal Administration
There is no mention of racial questions in federal legislation con-
cerned with Title I urban renewal projects. Present legislation does
require that a locality seeking Title I funds must submit a "workable
program," prepared with citizen participation, including provision for
the relocation of displaced families.49 In addition, the HHFA Admin-
istrator must certify the program to be adequate for the overall de-
velopment of the community, and must find that the program contains
an adequate number of "decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings" to be
available to displaced persons either "in the urban renewal area or in
other areas not generally less desirable."80
President Eisenhower assured Congress that aid and assistance would
be accorded on a nondiscriminatory basis:
[W] e shall take steps to insure that families of minority groups displaced
by urban redevelopment operations have a fair opportunity to acquire
adequate housing; we shall prevent the dislocation of such families through
the misuse of slum clearance programs; and we shall encourage adequate
Rep. Brown's comment, N.Y. Post, Apr. 28, 1960, p. 70. Acting U.S. Commissioner of
Public Housing, Lawrence Davern, testified that many cities, particularly in the North, are
reluctant to begin new public housing projects because they may be racially integrated.
N.Y. Times, May 10, 1960, p. 1, col. 5.
47 Completely integrated projects decreased from 20.0% in 1958 to 19.9% in 1960; the
percentage of Negro families living in integrated public housing projects varied slightly:
35.2% in 1958; 34.3% in 1959; 35.4% in 1960. Intergroup Relations Branch, PHA,
HHFA, Trends Toward Open Occupancy in Low-Rent Housing Programs of the Public
Housing Administration, June 1, 1960. New York City, frequently the forerunner in
social legislation and administration, quietly initiated a policy in February 1959 of
encouraging white families to move into projects in predominantly Negro neighborhoods
and vice versa, in order to further integration. Roshco, The New Leader 10 (1960), reported
in N.Y. Times, July 4, 1960, p. 1, col. 4.
48 For example, San Francisco Housing Commissioner Shemano suggested that the
S.F. Housing Authority buy old homes, renovate them, and rent them to low-income
families who could buy them from the Authority when their financial position improved.
Shemano argued that this plan would eliminate institutionalization of public housing and
location of projects in slum areas. S.F. Chronicle, Oct. 15, 1960, p. 1.
49 42 U.S.C. § 1451 (c) (1958). For a description of the effect of displacement on
Puerto Rican small businessmen in New York, see 1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 388.
50 63 Stat. 417 (1949), 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1958).
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mortgage financing for the construction of new housing for such families
on good, well-located sites.5
The HHFA Administrator testified before the Commission on Civil
Rights that "he intends to take action to assure that the intentions of
Congress are more fully achieved by breathing 'deeper meaning' into
the requirements of the workable program. He emphasizes that urban
renewal 'must result in adding to the living space available to the people
being displaced.'
How has this policy been carried out by URA?
The Urban Renewal Administration studied 42,998 families relo-
cated under its programs. Of this number, 30,372 were nonwhite, that is,
71 per cent. Of the nonwhite families, 2,066, or 6.8 per cent, were re-
located back into substandard housing, and 5,050, or 16.6 per cent, were
lost in the relocation program, with no records available to indicate the
kind of housing they moved into.5 3 In other words, almost one-quarter
of the nonwhite families were moved from one slum to other inadequate
housing.
From such statistics and testimony of housing experts, the United
States Civil Rights Commission summarized the problem:
Finally, the clearance of slums occupied largely by Negroes and the
construction of new housing beyond the means of most Negroes has given
rise to the suggestion that slum clearance is being used for 'Negro clear-
ance.' Because of the restricted housing available to Negroes, displace-
ment may mean their further concentration in overcrowded all-Negro
areas. Whether such accentuation of the pattern of residential segregation,
or in some cases the establishment for the first time of such a clear-cut
pattern, meets the congressional requirement of relocation in 'areas not
generally less desirable' than those originally occupied by the displaced
persons, is another pressing question.
54
A few months after the Commission issued its report, the United
States Housing Administrator notified purchasers of land in urban re-
newal programs that that they are required to abide by local laws for-
bidding racial discrimination in housing, and that a final determination
by a state or local tribunal that a developer has used land in violation
of such local law may result in the refusal of the federal government
to allow him to participate further in the program. 55
While this is a salutary action, it will not touch the majority of the
51 Quoted in U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 175.
52 Ibid.
53 1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 310. For examples of slum-dwellers displaced by a
Title I project seven years after being displaced by an earlier Title I project, see N.Y.
Times, Aug. 24, 1959, p. 23, col. 1, re Chelsea area, New York; N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1959,
p. 37, col. 8, re Rockaways, Brooklyn. And see note 13 supra.
54 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 174-75.
55 5 Race Rel. L. Rep. 562 (1960).
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nation which is not, as yet, covered by such legislation.5" Negro families
displaced by Title I projects in Eufaula and Gadsden, Alabama, tried
a different approach. They sought injunctive relief to prevent private
developers who purchased land cleared with government funds from
excluding Negroes from the new housing to be constructed there. The
federal district courts denied relief5 7 and dismissed the suits for lack
of an existing justiciable controversy, finding a lack of proof that Ne-
groes would be excluded from the proposed housing to be constructed.
The courts assumed that the private builders, "after receiving the fed-
eral assistance in this public project, will, upon completion of this
project (or any phase of it), recognize the law that is now so clear; this
law being to the effect that there can be no governmentally enforced
segregation solely because of race or color. 5 8
In voting to affirm the Gadsden decision, Judge Rives of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated his view that "the plan has not
been completed until the property passes out of the control of the re-
developer, and hence in disposing of property within either of the Areas
the redeveloper may not discriminate between purchasers on the basis
of race or color."59
The United States Commission on Civil Rights recommended that
the "Urban Renewal Administration take positive steps to assure that
in the preparation of overall community 'workable programs' for urban
renewal, spokesmen for minority groups are in fact included among the
citizens whose participation is required." 0° Commissioners Hesburgh
and Johnson supplemented this proposal with the suggestion that the
URA and HHFA examine all 'workable programs' to assure that no com-
munity is using federal urban renewal assistance to accomplish 'Negro
clearance,' as charged by witnesses before the Commission, who said
some Title I projects are creating new patterns of segregated neighbor-
hoods or substantially accentuating existing patterns of segregation. The
Commissioners stated that such examination would require the services
of persons of special competence in the field of inter-group relations.6'
66 See discussion beginning in text at note 104 infra.
57 Tate v. City of Eufaula, 165 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. Ala. 1958); Barnes v. City of Gadsden,
175 F. Supp. 64 (N.D. Ala. 1958), aff'd, 268 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915
(1959).
58 Tate v. City of Eufaula, 165 F. Supp. 303 at 306.
59 Barnes v. City of Gadsden, 268 F.2d 593, at 594, 598.
60 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 186. See, e.g., complaint of leaders
of the NAACP of lack of Negro representation in public housing study in Oakland, Cal.,
S.F. Chronicle, Dec. 4, 1959. URA prepared an excellent report describing optimum par-
ticipation in planning process by members of minority groups, relocation of nonwhite
families in private and public housing and rental units, reuse housing planned for biracial
or open occupancy, new private housing open to nonwhite families. Racial Minority Aspects
of Urban Renewal, Dec. 1958, Technical Memo No. 19, URA, reprinted in 2 Hearings,
supra note 3, 133-55.
61 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 187-88. For criticisms of Title I
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The two Commissioners also suggested that the federal-aid highway
program be amended to provide that "in any urban area where any
substantial number of low-income persons are to be displaced by the
construction of a Federally-aided highway, the locality must incorporate
the highway program in its urban renewal program, and the relocation
requirements and standards of the Urban Renewal Administration must
be met in regard to all such displaced persons, or the localities must
otherwise see that decent, safe, and sanitary housing is available to such
persons."6 2
Since the Commission's report, a new approach to urban renewal has
been inaugurated in the Riverside-Amsterdam area of New York City,
providing for spot clearance of some slum buildings, renovation of
others, as well as construction of new buildings. The great dislocation which
has accompanied most Title I projects, and displacement particularly of
minority group members who cannot find adequate housing, will be
substantially reduced in this project. As a result, residents petitioned to
have the project put into operation "expeditiously and without further
delay." URA officials expect many communities to propose projects of
this kind.e3
Federal Housing Authority and Veterans' Administration
There is no federal legislation covering racial aspects of FHA home
mortgage loan insurance or VA's loan guaranty program. The most
succinct description of the present policies and practices of these two
agencies is contained in the Report of the United States Commission on
Civil Rights:
[N]onwhite home buyers and renters have not enjoyed the benefits of
FHA mortgage insurance to the same extent as whites. According to testi-
mony before this Commission, fewer than 2 per cent of the total number of
new homes insured by FHA since 1946 have been available to minorities,
and most of these homes have been in all-Negro developments in the
South.
Although the lower participation of nonwhites has in part been due to
their lower incomes, FHA itself bears some responsibility. Until the
Supreme Court ruled in 1948 that official enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants was unconstitutional, FHA actually encouraged the use of such
covenants.
This is no longer the case, but FHA continues to insure mortgages on
housing developments where the builder announces his intention to exclude
Negroes, even where this is contrary to state or city laws against discrimi-
projects in New York City in terms of racial policies and creation of community disin-
tegration, see City-Wide Council for Better Housing, New York City's Slum Clearance
Committee: A Critical Study (1958); Cook & Gleason, "The Shame of New York", The
Nation, Oct. 31, 1959, pp. 284-99.
62 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 188.
63 N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1959, p. 22, col. 1.
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nation. FHA assistance has played an important part in the development
of all-white suburbs around most large cities. 64
There have been five suits brought against landowners or developers
who had received assistance in some form, seeking, on the basis of the
involvement of governmental aid, to compel them to sell or lease non-
discriminatorily. The first case, Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 5
involved only state and municipal assistance. The Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company, under the New York State Redevelopment Law,
constructed a large low-rent housing project. The corporation received
assistance from both the state and the city in the form of tax exemp-
tions, condemnation through the power of eminent domain, and sale to
the corporation of public streets in exchange for property surrounding
the project. In addition, the city retained certain managerial control
over the operation of the project, fixing maximum rents and profits and
prescribing limitations with respect to financing, disposing of the prop-
erty and altering of structures.
The corporation refused to rent an apartment in the project to an
applicant because of his color, whereupon the applicant brought an
action for an injunction to restrain the corporation from refusing to
lease an apartment. In refusing to grant the requested relief, the court
held that, in the absence of positive legislation governing the lease of
such projects, the corporation was free to refuse to lease accommoda-
tions to the applicants. It reasoned that the general state constitutional
guarantee of civil rights did not, perforce, require the company to rent
its units without regard to race or color.
It was argued that, because of the measure of governmental assist-
ance, the corporation was not acting merely as a private entity, but
was, in fact, an agent of the state; hence, its activities constituted state
action. Dismissing this argument, the court stated:
The aid which the state has afforded to respondents and the control to
which they are subject are not sufficient to transmute their conduct into
state action .... 66
Previously decided state action cases were distinguished on the ground
that "they disclose the exertion of governmental power directly to aid
in discrimination, ' '67 while the governmental assistance in the instant
case was of the character of indirect "helpful cooperation. '68
An additional factor which the court relied upon was that the agree-
64 At 171-72. Racial problems in obtaining mortgages are described in 1 Hearings, supra
note 3, at 225.
65 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
66 Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 536, 87 N.E.2d 541, 551 (1949).
67 Id. at 533, 87 N.E.2d at 550.
68 Id. at 535, 87 N.E.2d at 551.
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ment between the state and the corporation contained no provision for
the basis of selection of tenants. During negotiations the corporation
had insisted that it could not afford to make an investment of approx-
imately 90 million dollars were it required to accommodate tenants
without regard to race or color. The court construed this understanding
as being an agreement on the part of the state not to interfere with this
aspect of the management of the project. The corporation, relying on
the understanding, proceeded to build and invest and could not with-
draw under the terms of the agreement. It was therefore thought that
to now require it to do what it had insisted initially it could not afford
to do-with state acquiescence-would, in a sense, be confiscating the
corporation's investment.
The dissenting judges argued that even if the state had agreed as the
corporation insisted, such an agreement was of no effect since it was
contrary to constitutional requirements imposed on the state.69
Three of the cases, Ming v. Horgan,70 Johnson v. Levitt & Sons,
(Pa.) 71 and O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination,'
involved federal aid through FHA and VA, but no state aid. In the
Ming case, a Negro brought a civil suit for damages and other declara-
tory relief against certain named tract builder-subdividers and real estate
agents for refusing to sell him a tract home 'because of his race. Before
building the homes, the builder-subdividers had obtained FHA and VA-
insured mortgages. Both the developers and the real estate agents were
required under state law to secure licenses in order to construct tract
developments. Upon compliance with state law, the developers were
then qualified to seek federal assistance. They could, and in this in-
stance did, avail themselves of federal approval of plans, layouts, utility
services, construction standards and mortgage guarantees of loans upon
federal assurance that adequate standards had been met. To attract
prospective purchasers, the developers or their agents could advertise
VA and FHA financing. There were, to be sure, no direct grants of
federal funds to the developers.
The evidence adduced at the trial established that the developers and
their agents had followed a pattern of refusing to consider Negro ap-
plicants in the sale of the tract homes. The developers argued that the
federal commitments and other services received did not transform the
69 Id. at 544-45, 87 N.E.2d at 556-57.
70 Civil No. 97130, Super. Ct., Sacramento County, Cal., June 23, 1958. See also Com-
ment, "Builder of FHA Housing Held Barred From Discriminating Against Purchasers on
Basis of Race: Possible Sources of Federal Prohibition And Basis for Cause of Action,"
59 Colum. L. Rev. 782 (1959).
71 131 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
72 Civil No. 535996, Super. Ct., King County, Wash., July 31, 1959.
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character of the building from private to governmental; hence, they
were free to discriminate in the sale of the homes. Moreover, they
argued, Congress had not, in setting up the housing assistance programs,
placed any restraints on those who availed themselves of the assistance
with respect to the lease or sale of housing. They reasoned that, because
Congress had repeatedly rejected suggestions to include interdictions in
the housing assistance laws regarding sales or rental practices, it had
implicitly left the freedom of contract undisturbed.7 3
Rejecting this argument, the court stated:
If it be objected that Congress refused to so ordain, it must be replied that
Congress could not ordain otherwise-the law does not permit it to differen-
tiate between races, and whether it expresses that limitation in so many
words or not, those who operate under the law and seek and gain the ad-
vantage it confers are as much bound thereby as the administrative agencies
of government which have functions to perform in connection therewith.
Congress must have intended the supplying of housing to all citizens, notjust Caucasians-and on an equal, not a segregated basis.74
The court concluded that, because of the state regulation of the de-
velopers in addition to the federal assistance, they were governmental
agents.
In Johnson v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., certain Negro plaintiffs brought
an action in federal district court against both the federal government
and the developers of Levittown, Pennsylvania, seeking a declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant developers
refused them accommodations because of race. The developers had
received the same type of assistance as defendants in the Ming case,
including FHA and VA commitments. Plaintiffs argued that: (1) the
government had not acted to prohibit the discriminatory practices of the
developers, and (2) the developers, because of the assistance, were in
fact governmental agents.
The court dismissed the suit against the government, conceding that
the government probably had power to regulate the sale or lease prac-
tices of developers, but holding that the government was in no way
connected with the alleged discriminatory practices of the developers
and that an action would not lie to compel the court to protect an in-
dividual's rights when no such duty had been placed on the agencies
administering the housing assistance programs. Thus, the court followed
the familiar argument that when Congress acts with respect to a matter,
73 In the 1949 Housing Act, a non-discriminatory amendment was offered but rejected
on grounds it was unnecessary. See remarks of Senators Taft and Thye, 95 Cong. Rec.
4797 (1949). It was also argued that inclusion of such an amendment in the bill would
cause its defeat. Id. at 4855. Cf. remarks of Senator Douglas, id. at 4851-60.
74 Supra note 70.
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but is silent as to certain of its details, such silence is to be construed
as an intent not to regulate those aspects not specifically mentioned.
As to the developers, the court summarily held that the relationship
with the government was not sufficient to impose upon them those sanc-
tions imposed upon government in the sale or lease of its property.75
While the court did not enumerate its reasons for this holding, ap-
parently it viewed the federal assistance as the New York court in the
Stuyvesant Town Corporation case viewed state and municipal assist-
ance, as only "indirect . . . helpful cooperation."
In O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination, which
arose under the Washington statute discussed below, an individual home
owner, after advertising the property for sale, refused to sell his home
to a Negro. The home in question had been purchased through a private
sale insured by the FHA. It was argued that, apart from the state
statutory enactment, the public assistance the landowner had received
in the financing of his home constituted a valid basis for imposing upon
the owner the obligation to give equal treatment to prospective pur-
chasers. Rejecting this argument, but as an alternative ground for deci-
sion, the court held that the mere existence of an FHA-insured mortgage
on one's house is far "too tenuous a thread" to use in imposing drastic
sanctions on a private home owner. At the same time, the court con-
ceded that Ming and Levitt (N.J.) 76 may have been correctly decided:
A plausible argument can be made that one who obtains an FHA commit-
ment prior to construction of a mass housing development and thereafter
avails himself of all of the FHA administrative machinery including ap-
proval of plans and inspection during construction, thereby becomes so
intimately identified with government as to become affected with a public
interest. It can be argued that such people become, to coin a phrase,
persons of public accommodation.77
In the fifth case, Hackley v. Art Builders, Inc.,78 Negro plaintiffs,
seeking to purchase a home in an "all white" development under con-
struction, brought a class action in a federal district court against (1)
the developers (private corporations), (2) the county and sanitary
district, and (3) the commanding officer of the Army Chemical Center
75 See Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), where action was instituted
against the PUC, a governmental agency regulating public utilities in the District of
Columbia, by private persons who objected to the Commission's refusal to prohibit the
use of radio programs on streetcars and busses. Although the Court upheld the action of
the Commission, in so doing, it reviewed the Commission's action and found it to be
reasonable. See also, Horowitz, "The Misleading Search for State Action Under the Four-
teenth Amendment," 30 So. Cal. L. Rev. 208 (1957).76 Levitt v. Division Against Discrimination in State Dep't of Education, 31 N.J. 514,
158 A.2d 177 (1960).
77 Supra note 70.
78 179 F. Supp. 851 (D. Md. 1960).
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where plaintiff Hackley was employed in a civilian capacity, requesting
injunctive and declaratory relief.
The basic contentions of the plaintiffs were these: (1) That the
contracts of the county and sanitary district with the developers wherein
these governmental bodies agreed to furnish sewerage, water, storm
drains, streets and other required services to the development were
sufficient governmental assistance to give a public nature to the developers'
activities; (2) that an agreement between the Army, county and
sanitary district, whereby the Army agreed to furnish water and sewage
facilities to the county, which would in turn be made available to the
development under the county's contract with the developers, con-
stituted additional government assistance, and that under this dual
arrangement with the developers, the services furnished to the latter
were sufficient to make their activities governmental rather than private;
and (3) that the concurrence of the local governmental bodies and the
Army Chemical Center in the practice of racial discrimination against
plaintiff Hackley, an employee of "a priority National Defense instal-
lation" and a member of the Reserved Armed Forces, unreasonably inter-
fered with Congress' powers to raise and support armies and secure the
national defense under article 1, section 8, of the Constitution.
There was no assistance given to the developers similar to that given
in Ming, Stuyvesant Town, O'Meara and Levitt (Pa.). Both the county
and sanitary 'district were required by statute to furnish sanitary services
impartially to all applicants. It was conceded that the refusal to sell
was based siolely on race. The sole question was whether the sanitary
services rendered under the above arrangements constituted govern-
ment aid legally sufficient to treat the developers as a government agency.
Answering in the negative, the court held that the agreement between
the developers and the county and sanitary district was an "arms-length
contract" under which payments by the developers were made for
services rendered by the governmental bodies. This was considered as
no different from myriad contracts the sanitary district had with other
parties who had need for its services. This agreement gave the developers
no additional benefit over other developers nor did it place upon them
any special tasks relative to the general public.
The thread between all of the cases discussed is the common question:
What quantum of assistance must be present in order to transform the
activity from private to governmental action? While it is doubtless true
that every modicum of assistance in whatever form or however remote
should not be held sufficient to constitute governmental action, it is
equally important that when government and private persons act in
19611
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concert, the government's contribution should not be made in such a
way as to work deprivations of constitutionally protected rights.
Although Stuyvesant Town, Levitt, O'Meara and Ming are basically
alike-when compared to Hackley-in that all involved some direct
governmental assistance, there are distinguishing features within these
cases. In Stuyvesant Town the court made control the determinative
test--control over the activities of the project as required by state law.
And having found that the state did not retain control over the matter
of selection of tenants, it concluded that the developers were free to
discriminate against the applicants. In Ming the court made the bifur-
cated regulation of developers by state licensing requirements and
federal regulation of standards of construction determinative. It ex-
pressly stated that, standing alone, the state regulation of the developers
was not enough, but taken together, the state and federal regulation
provided a sufficient basis for transforming the activities of the developers
from private to governmental in character. In Johnson federal assistance
alone was present. There the court made determinative the absence of
congressional regulation of the sale and lease practices of assisted
developers and the lack of a close relationship between the developers
and the government. In O'Meara, as an alternative ground for decision,
the court made the nexus between the governmental assistance and the
recipient, the size of the undertaking, and the conditions placed upon
receipt of the assistance, decisive.
From these cases it can readily be seen that the question has yet to
be answered by clearly defined legal norms. Following the 1883 decision
in the Civil Rights Cases,79 where wholly private discriminatory practices
were held not interdicted by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, there have been many instances where private individuals,
because of their relationship to government, or because their activities
were aided or in some manner fostered by government, have been held
to be acting for or as government and, therefore, subject to the inter-
dictions against governmental action. In American Communications Ass'n
v. Douds,80 the Court observed:
But power is never without responsibility. And when authority derives
in part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power
by private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise
by Government itself.
The government's thumb has been found involved in a number of
decisions which may well point the way to determining the quantum
79 109 U.S. 3 (1883).80 339 U.S. 382, 401 (1950).
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of private-governmental relationship necessary to transform the activities
of aided housing developers from a private to a governmental character
and thus extend constitutional proscriptions against government to their
selling and leasing activities. A labor union which is the exclusive bar-
gaining agent for collective bargaining,81 a private association conducting
an election on behalf of a state, 2 a private association leasing park
facilities from the state, 83 a private cafeteria leasing space in a public
building, 4 a state park leased to private operators,88 a privately estab-
lished library operated, controlled and financed by the state,8 a private
concessionaire operating in a city and federal airport,8 7 a swimming
pool leased to private operators,88 and what was, in the case, held to be
a "company town,"8 9 were held to be engaged in activity of a govern-
mental nature and therefore subject to the same constitutional pro-
scriptions applicable against government.
There is a second class of decisions in which a private-governmental
relationship was extant, holding the relationship to be insufficient to
change the character of the private activity. It has been held that a
labor union may exclude Negroes from membership even though it was
certified by the federal government as the exclusive bargaining agent.90
A hospital which received public funds for services rendered may exclude
doctors from practicing therein because of race or color.91 A boys' club
operated by a private corporation partially in public buildings, with sub-
stantial financial assistance from the public, with policemen assigned to
work with the clubs, may validly limit membership to a particular
81 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) ; Syres v. Oil Workers Intl, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) ;
Brotherhood v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Tunstall v. Brotherhood, 323 U.S. 210
(1944); Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
82 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1947).
83 Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), vacating and re-
manding 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953).
84 Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956).
85 Department of Constr. & Dev. v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1956). But see Willie
v. Harris County, 5 Race Rel. L. Rep. 146 (Civil No. 11926, S.D. Tex. 1960), where Negro
plaintiffs brought a class action against the county alleging discriminatory practices in
the use of the park facilities operated directly by the county. The action was held to be
prematurely brought because only "one instance" of refusal of use had been shown to
have occurred and the plaintiffs had not petitioned the county requesting remedial action.
And see Reid v. City of Norfolk, 179 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Va. 1960), where similar exhaus-
tion-of-remedies reasoning was used.
88 Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945).
87 Coke v. City of Atlanta, 5 Race Rel. L. Rep. 138 (Civil No. 6733, N.D. Ga. 1960);
Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 104 (SD. Va. 1948).
88 Culver v. City of Warren, 52 Ohio L. Abs. 385, 83 N.E.2d 82 (1948).
89 Marsh v Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
0 Oliphant v. Brotherhood, 156 F. Supp. 89 (ND. Ohio, 1957), aff'd, 262 F.2d 359 (7th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959). And see, James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.
2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946).
91 Eaton v. Bd. of Managers, 164 F. Supp. 191 (D.N.C. 1958), aff'd, 261 F.2d 521 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
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race. 2 A public golf course leased to private persons may, it has been
held, segregate on the basis of race . 3 A private school with 23 per cent
of its revenue from public funds and a percentage of its students ap-
pointed by public officials has been held to be free to exclude students
of certain racial or ethnic groups. 4 And the lease of a municipal audi-
torium to private persons does not, it has been held, impose upon the
lessees a duty to accept all patrons without regard to race or color. 5
Although the two groups of cases were decided differently, together
they indicate what factors courts consider material in determining whether
a particular activity has ceased to be merely private and has taken on a
governmental character. The relevant factors seem to be:
(1) Control: What control has the government over the private
activity?
(2) Benefit: What aid did the private person or group receive,
and in what manner was it given, directly or indirectly?
(3) Nature of the activity as it relates to governmental functions:
To what extent does the private activity displace, duplicate or
otherwise partake of what has heretofore been classified as a
governmental function?
The most effective criticism of the FHA and VA's policies is contained
in the material quoted from the United States Civil Rights Com-
mission's Report. The Commission found that:
The present policy of the Federal Housing Administration and the
Veterans' Administration is not to do further business with a builder who
has been found in violation of a State or city law prohibiting discrimina-
tion.96
and recommended:
... that, in support of State and city laws the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration and the Veterans' Administration should strengthen their present
agreements with States and cities having laws against discrimination in
housing by requiring that builders subject to these laws who desire the
benefits of Federal mortgage insurance and loan guaranty programs agree
92 Mitchell v. Boys Club, 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C. 1957).
93 Norris v. Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948). But see the more recent cases
to the contrary, Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 124 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1954), aff'd, 223
F.2d 93 (5th 'Cir.), rev'd and remanded, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Beale v. Holcombe, 103
F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Tex. 1950), aff'd, 193 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
974 (1954).
94 Easterly v. Dempster, 112 F. Supp. 214 (D. Tenn. 1953).
95 Harris v. St. Louis, 111 S.W.2d 995 (Mo. 1938). The validity of this decision is ques-
tionable today. In Jones v. Marva Theatres & City of Frederick, 180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md.
1960), a case identical in all essentials to the Harris case, it was held that municipal
ownership of a theatre, even though leased to a private person, did not change the nature
of the facility from a public to a private one and thus the interdictions of the fourteenth
amendment were applicable. The Harris decision was not cited or discussed by the court.
96 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 184.
[Vol. 46
MINORITY HOUSING
in writing that they will abide by such laws. FHA and VA should estab-
lish their own factfinding machinery to determine whether such builders are
violating State and city laws, and, if it is found that they are, immediate
steps should be taken to withdraw Federal benefits from them, pending
final action by the appropriate State agency or court.9 7
In August 1959, HHFA Administrator Norman P. Mason eliminated
racial quotas from relocation housing. Shortly after the Commission's
report was issued, VA reached agreement with the New York State
Commission Against Discrimination to insure that VA-owned properties
in New York would be marketed on a nondiscriminatory basis. In
November 1959, FHA instructed all staff members in the country to
immediately inform all brokers handling acquired properties that the
sale and rental of government-owned foreclosed housing shall be handled
"without distinction as to race, creed, or color.""8 In 1960, the FHA
made available to FHA field offices a public information record of FHA-
financed houses which had been repossessed and listed for resale or
rental, in response to complaints by Negro brokers that they had been
unable to secure this information."
In addition to these reforms, witnesses before the Commission urged
that FHA underwriters be instructed to give priority to applications
for loan insurance on renovation of urban property in integrated areas.
Community organizations "fighting blight" felt FHA discriminated
against their work by delaying action on loan guarantee applications, while
quickly approving applications for new homes in all-white suburbs.'
The Commission heard considerable testimony concerning the role of
banks and other mortgage-lending institutions in supporting racial segre-
gation.10 1 While most lenders insist that they make no racial or color
distinctions in the granting of loans, and can show substantial port-
folios of loans to nonwhites, there is no doubt that nonwhite borrowers
are restricted to certain racial districts. This serves to sustain segregation
and disadvantages minority mortgagors in terms of mortgage credit,
because properties in the areas where they are permitted to buy are
generally inferior risks from a lender's standpoint.
10 2
The Commission made no finding or recommendation on this point.
However, it would be in line with HHFA's announced policy of elim-
inating racial discrimination for FHA (and VA) to notify mortgage-
lending institutions that racial segregation is against federal policy.
97 Ibid.
98 Trends In Housing, November-December 1959, p. 1.
99 Release by Washington State Bd. against Discrimination, Sept. 12, 1960.
100 1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 877-78.
101 1 Hearings, pt. 1, at 224-25, 481, 492-93.
102 Where Shall We Live, supra note 22, p. 29.
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Since FHA and VA insure loans issued by such institutions, the &overn-
ment's policy could have an immediate effect on the lending policies of
the institutions.
II. STATE AND CITY LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO FAIR HOUSING AND
THEm VALIDITY
State Fair Housing Laws
Fourteen states and approximately thirty-three cities have enacted
laws regulating in some form the sale, lease or rental of housing accom-
modations. During the 1959 general legislative season five states either
strengthened existing law or wrote upon a clean slate. In addition, the
problem has been investigated and studied in a limited way by the United
States Civil Rights Commission.1 0°
A. 1959 Laws
1. Colorado. Colorado was the first state to enact a comprehensive
fair housing practices law. In rather sweeping terms, its coverage includes
"any building, structure, or part thereof which is used or occupied, or is
intended, arranged or designed to be used or occupied as the home or
residence of one or more human beings; or any vacant land for sale or
lease; but does not include premises maintained by the owner or lessee
as the household of his family with or without domestic servants and
not more than four boarders and lodgers."'104 Presumably, this provision
covers all housing, no matter how financed; that is, it covers private
housing financed through conventional methods as well as housing financed
with governmental assistance (state or federal).
The act prohibits owners of any housing accommodation from refus-
ing to transfer, rent or lease to any person because of race, creed, color,
sex, or national origin or ancestry. It also forbids any owner from dis-
criminating on any of these grounds in the terms, conditions or privileges
pertaining to any housing or in the furnishing of facilities or services in
connection therewith. Owners are also prohibited from making any
written or oral inquiry or record concerning the above factors.
In addition, there are general prohibitions: No person may include in
any transfer, rental or lease of housing any restrictive covenant or
honor or put into effect such covenant.' Nor may anyone print or
publish notices or advertisements relating to the transfer, rental or
103 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 139-89. Studies of cognate problems
invariably reflect the problems in the housing field. See, Advisory Comm. of Citizens,
supra note 5, at 7.
104 Colorado Fair Housing Act of 1959.
1o5 Id. § S(1)(c).
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lease of any housing which indicate a preference, limitation or discrimina-
tion on the basis of race or color, etc.
Banks and financial institutions are prohibited from making inquiries
of race or color, etc., of persons seeking financial assistance. Nor may
these institutions discriminate on such grounds in the terms, conditions or
privileges relating to obtaining financial assistance.
The act provides a limited exception from these prohibitions to
religious or denominational institutions or organizations which control
housing accommodations. These organizations are free to select tenants
or buyers or restrict use of their facilities to members or persons deemed
to be in the best interest of the organization. Under this provision a
religious group operating an old-age or rest home could restrict use of
its facilities to members only--even if it did not include certain ethnic
groups in its general membership. But it could not deny use of its
facilities to an applicant solely on the basis of race or color.
Finally, the act exempts groups or persons leasing accommodations
"only to members of one sex." The YMCA and YWCA, it seems, are
representative organizations falling within this exemption. But again,
the exclusion must be based on sex only.
Enforcement of the act is entrusted to the Colorado Anti-Discrimina-
tion Commission, an agency created in 1955 to administer the state's
fair employment and public accommodations laws.
The procedure is typical of administrative boards generally. Any
aggrieved person may file a complaint with the Commission within ninety
days after the occurrence of the alleged unfair housing practice. The
Commission must seek first to conciliate the matter, and failing in this,
it may then require the defendant to appear before the full Commission
and, upon the evidence adduced, adjudicate the controversy. It may
issue a cease and desist order or take other affirmative actions including,
but not limited to, the transfer, rental or lease of the property in question.
The Commission is also empowered to subpoena witnesses, take testi-
mony of witnesses under oath, and compel the production of any books
or papers relating to the subject matter of the complaint filed. Persons
claiming to be aggrieved by an order of the Commission, including
refusal to issue an order, may obtain judicial review of such administra-
tive action.106
106 In the first order issued under the new fair housing law, In re Rhone, Negro plain-
tiffs sought unsuccessfully to purchase a house in an all white neighborhood. Before the
refusal, plaintiff's earnest money receipt was accepted and a contract signed, but thereafter
the real estate agents sought to release themselves from the sale. After a hearing, the
CA-D.C. issued an order directing the defendants to give plaintiffs "the opportunity of
purchasing a comparable home in the same general neighborhood or a comparable neigh-
borhood in Colorado Springs, Colorado ... and under the same terms and conditions
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2. Massachusetts. Massachusetts was the second state to enact a
comprehensive fair housing law.107 Amending the 1957 Housing Act, 08
the 1959 act prohibits an owner, lessee, sub-lessee, assignee or managing
agent from refusing to sell or lease to a prospective occupant because of
race or creed. Like the Colorado act, it covers both public and private
housing generally. Briefly, the law covers: (1) multiple dwellings and
developments of ten or more one- or two-family units "located on land
that is contiguous (exclusive of public streets)," or (2) housing which
"was one of ten or more lots of a tract whose plans have been submitted
to a planning board...."
Written or oral inquiries or records concerning race, creed or color
of a prospective occupant are also prohibited.
The act is administered by an administrative board created under the
1957 act. Its procedures are basically the same as those of the Colorado
Commission. Also, the penalties in the 1957 act are applicable to the
instant act.0 9
The act was patterned after the New York City Fair Housing
Ordinance. The Massachusetts act does not, however, contain the
New York provision exempting religious or charitable groups which
maintain housing accommodations from the broad prohibition. However,
it would seem that this omission is not material.1 0
During a 1960 session of the legislature, Massachusetts amended its
1959 act to prohibit any person engaged in the business of granting
mortgage loans from discriminating against any person in the granting
of such loans because of race, color, creed, religion or national origin."'
In a December 1959 opinion the state attorney general had ruled that
the state's Public Accommodation statute was applicable to real estate
agents in accepting bookings and other services rendered by such persons
because, as the opinion states, a real estate agency is a "place which is
open to and accepts and solicits the patronage of the general public,"
even though the property in question was not of the type specifically
mentioned in the state's Fair Housing law." 2
as such a home would be offered to any other person." The matter has been appealed and
is presently pending. Rhone v. J. L. Case & Co., 6 Civ. Lib. Docket 43 (1960).
107 Acts and Resolves of Mass., ch. 239, Acts of 1959.
108 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 151B, § 1(12) (Supp. 1959).
109 Violators may be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than
$500, or both. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 151B, § 8 (1957).
110 Although the provision is captioned an exemption (and this is true of the Colorado
act), it is nothing more that an preference. Religious groups may limit use of their
facilities to those promoting their principles or members, but they may not solely on the
basis of race, color or religion, exclude others.
Ill Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 1S1B, § 4 (Adv. Service 1960, p. 70).
112 5 Race Rel. L. Rep. 253, 254 (1959). This, then, is in fact not a discrimination-at
least not of the type against which the act operates-and being merely a preference, not
covered by the act, religious groups in Massachusetts may so lease or operate their ac-
commodations with impunity.
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3. Connecticut. Amending an early law,113 Connecticut was the third
state to enact a comprehensive fair housing law covering generally
public and private housing.
The Connecticut Act has a two-fold objective: It prohibits discrimina-
tion because of race, creed or color in places of public accommodation,
and in housing. In the terms of the act, the housing covered is "public
housing projects and all other forms of publicly assisted housing, and
further including any housing accommodation offered for sale or rent
which is one of five or more housing accommodations all of which are
located on a single parcel of land or parcels of land that are contiguous
without regard to highways or streets, and all of which any person owns
or otherwise controls the sale or rental thereof." 14
The act is administered by the Connecticut Commission on Civil
Rights. This agency operates in much the same fashion as the
Colorado and Massachusetts boards. Its primary duty is to seek to bring
about adjustments of complaints arising between prospective occupants
and landlords. However, in addition to this administrative remedy,
violators of the act may be penalized.115
Four civil rights statutes were passed at the 1959 session of the
Connecticut General Assembly. Three of the measures-fair employment,
broadening powers of the Commission with respect to initiating com-
plaints, and fair housing-were recommended by the Commission. After
studying the housing problem in the state, the Commission recommended
enactment of a statute similar to those in New York City, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, but the end product is perhaps an
admixture of the three. Its coverage is more pervasive than its three
models, and it, like the Massachusetts act, does not provide an ex-
emption to religious or charitable organizations operating housing
accommodations.
4. Oregon. Amending in part and repealing in part an earlier law,116
Oregon enacted a new law regulating primarily the activities of persons
engaged in the business of selling or leasing housing.117 It prohibits
such persons from engaging in certain discriminatory practices, based
on the incidents listed in the above statutes: (1) accepting or retaining
113 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-35 (Supp. 1959) amending § 1407b, Acts of 1949. And
see, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-36 (Supp. 1959), broadening the powers of the Civil
Rights Commission. For comments on the acts, see, Conn. State Comm'n on Civil Rights,
Civil Rights Bulletin, June 1959, p. 4.
114 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-35 (Supp. 1959).
115 A violator may be penalized by a fine of not less than $25 or more than $100 and
may be imprisoned for not more than 30 days, or both. In addition, a violator may be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year or both under the
general statutes. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-35 (Supp. 1959).
110 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 659.032 (Supp. 1957).
117 Id. § 659.010, Supp. 1959.
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a listing of property with the understanding that a prospective purchaser
may be discriminated against; (2) refusing to sell, lease or rent; (3)
making a distinction in price, terms, or conditions of sale; (4) attempt-
ing to discourage a sale, rental or lease; and (5) expelling an occupant
from housing accommodations.
In a general provision, the act forbids any kind of circulation, dis-
play or advertisement which indicates a preference or limitation based
on race, color or creed, etc.
There is also another general provision which prohibits any person
from assisting, inducing or inciting another person to engage in conduct
violative of the act.
The act is administered by an administrative board in much the same
manner as the above statutes. There are, however, as in the Connecticut
act, criminal penalties in addition to administrative relief.118
As stated at the outset, owners as such are not covered by the pro-
hibitions against discrimination in the sale or lease of property. They are,
however, prohibited from advertising that they will sell on a discrimina-
tory basis. They are also prohibited from working in concert with a real
estate broker or agent in discriminatory housing practices. There are,
then, restraints both direct and indirect against owners, as owners, in
the sale or lease of their property. They are not entirely at liberty to
disregard the prohibitions of the act.
The act has no provision setting forth the type of units covered or
nature of the financing of the housing, as is common to all of the
remaining acts. Presumably, it covers all housing whatever size, location
or structure.
5. California. At its 1959 legislative session, the California General
Assembly enacted three major civil rights bills: (1) a fair employment
practices law,"9 (2) amendments to the public accommodations law, 20
and (3) a fair housing law, covering publicly assisted housing generally.' 2 '
The Housing Act prohibits discrimination, based on the incidents
common to all of the fair housing laws, in the sale or lease of the following
categories of housing:
(1) Housing which at the time of unlawful discrimination is ex-
empted in whole or in part from taxes levied by the state or
any of its political subdivisions. 22
118 Id. § 659.110.
119 California Fair Employment Practices Act, Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1410-32 (Deering Supp.
1959).
120 Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (Deering 1960).
121 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 35700-40 (Deering Supp. 1959).
122 Id. § 35710(3)(a).
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(2) Any housing constructed on land sold below cost by the state
pursuant to the Federal Housing Act of 1949.
(3) Any housing constructed in whole or in part on property acquired
by the state through the power of condemnation or otherwise for
the purpose of constructing housing thereon.
(4) Housing located in a multiple dwelling-which is defined in the
act as "a dwelling . . . occupied . . . for permanent residence
purposes or which is rented, leased [etc.] ... to be occupied as a
residence or home of three or more families living independently
of each other," and which is financed in whole or in part by
federal, state or local funds.
(5) Developments of five or more housing accommodations located
on land that is contiguous, exclusive of public streets, which is
financed in whole or in part by government funds.123
In a somewhat restrictive provision, inquiries concerning the race,
creed or religion of prospective tenants are prohibited. Owners, with
knowledge that their property is financed, either in whole or in part,
through public assistance, are not permitted to make inquiries, written
or oral, concerning the race or creed of a prospective occupant "for the
purpose of violating" the act. 24
Probably the ready legal answer would be that under the California
provision, it is, as with all laws, merely a matter of proof-proof that
the inquiry was made for the purpose of getting around the interdictions
of the act. But in practical operation and effect, this restrictive clause
greatly dilutes the positive interdictions against the actual sale, rental
or lease of property. It becomes apparent by merely posing the question:
What purpose could such an inquiry to a prospective occupant serve if
the owner is, in the first instance, prohibited from dealing with him on
the basis of his race, creed or color? The provision, it seems, is merely
tautological since the statute, in terms, makes race, color, religion or
creed irrelevant considerations in leasing or selling certain types of
publicly assisted housing.
In a separate section, privately owned property is exempted from the
coverage of the act. 2 5
Unlike other fair housing laws, enforcement is entrusted to court
action. An aggrieved person is given a right of action in an appropriate
court for "restraint of such violation and for other equitable remedies
including such affirmative relief as may be necessary to undo the effects
123 Id. § 35710 (3)(b), (3)(c), (3)(d), (3)(e).
124 Id. § 35720(3).
125 Id. § 35740.
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of such violation." 126 In addition, an aggrieved person is given a right of
action for damages "in a sum of not less than five hundred dollars" for
loss caused by a violation.
The success of this act, then, depends upon the effectiveness of the
judicial relief. It is, to be sure, more cumbersome and less expeditious
than administrative relief. But under the general provision authorizing
equitable relief, an aggrieved person may well be able to secure complete
relief. In the first cases brought under the act, prompt relief was obtained
when the trial courts issued preliminary injunctions restraining the
unwilling tract developers from selling the lots selected by the willing
Negro buyers, pending trial.12
7
In addition, according to a recent opinion rendered by the Attorney
General of California, the 1959 amended Public Accommodations Act
is applicable to real estate operators. 8 Should the Attorney General's
opinion become law, there would be accomplished in a limited measure
what the legislature declined to do, that is, regulate the sale or lease
of private property. If a real estate broker or agent is prohibited from
denying the "accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or ser-
vices" to an individual because of his race or color, he could not, con-
sistently with the act, refuse to sell, lease or rent available accommoda-
tions whether they be private or publicly assisted. 2 9 It may be that the
lawmakers "builded better than they knew."
126 Id. § 35730.
127 Pearson v. Frumenti, Civil No. R 7073, Super. Ct., 5(2) Civ. Lib. Docket 41, Contra
Costa County, Cal., Nov. 20, 1959. Negro plaintiffs tried to purchase an FHA insured
home in a development. It was alleged that the refusal to sell was because of the race
of the plaintiffs. At the trial in April 1960, the defendants indicated a desire not to pro-
ceed with the case and entered into an agreement whereby another house was offered plus
damages ($400), contingent upon plaintiffs' securing financing for the new house.
128 34 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 230 (1959). While this opinion, should it become law, may
strengthen the fair housing act, it raises a host of questions. The public accommodations
act gives an aggrieved person a right of action for damages in an amount not less than
$500, just as the fair housing act does. Would not, then, an aggrieved person have two
causes of action based on the same delict, assuming the housing in question is also cov-
ered by the housing act? The interdictions in the housing act operate not only against
the owner but against any one who endeavors to sell housing accommodations covered by
the act contrary to its provisions.
True, the acts have different and distinct spheres of coverage: One operates against the
seller or owner of publicly assisted property and the other, against operators of public
places of accommodation. But there are areas where the two seem to overlap.
The basic objective of the acts is to protect certain groups against discrimination. It
would appear, then, that a person could have but one cause of action growing out of
discriminatory practices prohibited in both acts. Once a violator has been brought to
book-even if the conduct complained of is violative of another act designed to achieve
the same or identical end-the matter would thereafter be at an end. In short, the second
action would be barred. There may of course be instances where an aggrieved may have
two causes of actions against the same individual based on two distinct wrongs.
129 The first reported case is Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., Civil No. 496068, Super. Ct.,
S.F. County, Cal. January 26, 1960, 5(2) Civ. Lib. Docket 41, where plaintiffs, Negroes,
were denied solely because of their race the right to purchase a tract home advertised for
sale. Action was instituted under the Fair Housing Act and the amended Unruh Civil
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B. Prior Enactments
The five laws enacted in 1959 by no means accurately reflect the
general concern and efforts by states to remedy the problems of denial of
housing facilities to certain groups. Thirteen states, including those
discussed above, considered proposals designed to regulate the lease or
sale of housing accommodations.' 10 Many of these proposals were
passed by one house of the legislature but either were defeated by the
other or allowed to succumb by adjournment.
Nor is 1959 a record year. In 1957 five states' 31 enacted laws regulat-
ing in some manner discrimination in housing. Four of these laws prohibit
discrimination in publicly assisted housing, which covers federal as-
sistance in addition to state or local aid. As noted above, this was a
dominant feature in many of the 1959 laws. These laws are generally
limited in coverage to developments of not less than a minimum number
of houses on contiguously located land, or multiple dwellings of a
minimum number of units. Several forbid discriminatory questions of
prospective occupants.
The original Oregon law and the Washington law forbid discriminatory
advertising.
The Washington act also contains a provision which the recent
Colorado act incorporated. It prohibits discrimination by financial institu-
tions in making inquiries of applicants for loans and in making loans
for houses covered by the act.
Although rejecting a proposal to prohibit discriminatory housing prac-
tices generally, Minnesota enacted a law declaring it to be a civil right
to buy, rent or enjoy housing accommodations, and created an interim
commission to study the problem for a two-year period.' 32 It is unclear
Rights Act against the construction company, realty company and the agents handling
the accommodations. See also Gerrish v. Shattuck, Super. Ct., San Diego County, Cal.,
January 1960, 5(2) Civ. Lib. Docket 41, where only damages are being sought against a
builder, lending institution and real estate broker for allegedly conspiring to deny plain-
tiffs certain housing accommodations because of the national origin of one of the plain-
tiffs. Neither the fair housing act nor the public accommodations act is expressly invoked.
A similar pending case is Holmes v. Macco Constr. Co., Civil No. 247453, Super. Ct., San
Diego County, Cal. In Hudson v. Nixon, Civil No. 28219, Super. Ct. Merced County, Cal.,
5(4) Civ. Lib. Docket 96, January 5, 1960, Negro plaintiffs were granted $1,000 damages
in a suit filed under the new Fair Housing Law and the amended Public Accommodations
Act when defendants refused to lease rental accommodations because of plaintiffs' race.
130 In addition to the five laws discussed above, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Washington considered fair housing legislative
proposals. See, American Jewish Congress Memo No. 257, May 11, 1959.
131 Massachusetts: supra note 108; Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Ann. 462.481 (Supp. 1959);
New Jersey; NJ. Stat. Ann. § 18:25 (Supp. 1959); Oregon: supra note 116; and Wash-
ington: Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.217 (1959). The states are collected in Nondiscrimina-
tion Clauses in Regard to Public Housing, Private Housing and Urban Redevelopment
Undertakings (rev. ed. 1957). See also Sherr, "Present Status of Legislation Prohibiting
Discrimination in Housing," 18 Law. Guild Rev. 23 (1958).
132 Supra note 131.
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whether this mere declaration of state public policy accords to aggrieved
persons a right of action, either civil or equitable, upon a violation of
this declared right. If equitable relief is proper, then one could ac-
complish through the courts what the legislature expressly declined to
do, i.e., regulate discriminatory practices in housing. On the other hand,
if civil damages are proper, the question then arises as to the measure.
Would an aggrieved party be entitled to compensatory damages or merely
nominal damages to vindicate his rights? There appears to have been
no reported litigation arising under this provision. 3
Prior to 1957 there had been occasional enactment of fair housing
laws in several states.3 4 These laws operated in much the same manner
as those discussed in detail above. Many states followed a serial pattern
of enactment; that is, a public housing law was first enacted, and later,
publicly assisted housing was included. The history of New York's fair
housing legislation is illustrative. In 1939 New York enacted a public
housing law, prohibiting discrimination in the state's low-rent public
housing projects and private housing built under the state's Limited
Dividend Law.135 In 1946, legislation was enacted to regulate housing
practices in emergency housing for veterans.'36 Later, in 1950, the law
was again amended to cover publicly assisted housing.3 7 And in 1955
the law was further amended to cover housing accommodations receiving
publicly insured financing. 138 As can be seen from this chronology, each
successive step extends the coverage of the law to other facets of the
same problem.
Following a similar serial pattern, New Jersey amended its anti-
discrimination law in 1960 to authorize the Commissioner of Education,
who supervises the operations of the Division Against Discrimination, to
file complaints on his own initiative and in the absence of complaints
by aggrieved parties.'39
133 In Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 530, 87 N.E.2d 541, 548 (1949),
the court held, inter alia, that the general state constitutional provision, "No person shall,
because of his race, color, creed or religion be subjected to any discrimination in his civil
rights by any other person", did not, perforce, provide a basis for striking down discrim-
inatory practices of individuals. See also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); and
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), where damages were not allowed, though there
were violations of constitutional rights. And see Note, 44 11. L. Rev. 363 (1949).
'34 See supra note 131, and 2 Emerson & Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the United
States 1258-60 (2d ed. 1958).
135 N.Y. Pub. Housing Law.
136 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1946, ch. 3, § 201 (expired 1953).
137 N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 18a-e (Supp. 1960).
138 N.Y. State Fin. Law § 178.
139 N.J. Laws 1960, ch. 59.
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C. Comparison
Graphically, the present status of state fair housing legislation is as
follows:
A COMPARISON OF STATE FAIR HOUSING LEGISLATION
COVERAGE ENTORCEN[ENT
Publicly
Assisted FHA-
and/or and Lending Adminis-
Public Urban VA- Private Institu- Adver- trative
STATE Housing Renewal insured Housing fions tising Agency Judicial
California X X X X X X
Colorado X X X X X X X
Connecticut X X X X X
Indiana X X
Massachusetts X X X X X X X
Michigan X X
Minnesota X X X
New Jersey X X X X X
New York X X X X
Oregon X X X X X X
Pennsylvania X X X
Rhode Island X X
Washington X X X X X
Wisconsin X X X
Note: Illinois prohibits restrictive covenants in redevelopment housing.
City Fair Housing Ordinances
Presently, approximately thirty-three cities have ordinances or reso-
lutions affecting discrimination in housing.140 Although the wisdom of
municipal activity in this area has been questioned, 4  much of the
present state legislation came after the localities had acted, and, in
addition, states have at times looked to the municipalities for guidance in
enacting state laws.
The New York City Ordinance, used as a model by Connecticut and
Massachusetts, in its main essentials is the same as the state acts. 42
It is administered by the Commission on Intergroup Relations, an
agency created under the 1955 housing ordinance. 48
There are, however, two features found in the New York Ordinance
which were not incorporated in state statutes. An intermediate review
board was set up to review the action of COIR after conciliation had
failed and before a matter could be taken into court. The addition of
this step in the administrative procedure for relief was thought by many
to make difficult a simple and expeditious procedure for relief. The
ordinance also requires that all proceedings before COIR and the
140 Discussed infra at p. 243. See also 3 Trends in Housing May-June 1959, p. 8,
listing thirty-two of the municipalities with fair housing ordinances.
141 Note, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515, 533-40 (1959).
142 5 N.Y. City Code & Charter § W41-1.0 (Supp. 1960).
143 Id. at § W41-1.0 (g).
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newly created review board be "confidential." This requirement was
opposed generally at the time of enactment because it was thought to be
ambiguous. Opponents of the requirement argued that it might be
construed to apply to a complainant seeking relief before COIR or the
board and to newspapers merely reporting newsworthy occurrences.
Little need for the requirement could be seen if it was directed to benefit
COIR or the board since both were empowered to subpoena evidence and
hold hearings. Nevertheless, there seem to have been no problems arising
under these provisions.
The ordinance is not a penal statute. As originally introduced, it
contained penal provisions but on final passage enforcement was left
primarily to COIR. However, in at least one instance the probation
department of the city magistry imposed a sentence on a tenement agent
where it was found in her probation report that the Fair Housing
Law, in addition to other safety ordinances, had been violated.'44
In a recent case before a state supreme court, the ordinance was held
to be constitutionally valid. The court could find no merit in the argu-
ment that the enactment unreasonably infringed a real estate operator's
right to freedom of selection of tenants or was otherwise beyond the ken
of legislative police powers.'45
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, is the only other city regulating private
housing in some manner.'46 Its ordinance covers sales or rentals by
persons who own or control five or more units and all parallel activities
of real estate operators and lending institutions. Like the New York
City ordinance, it is enforced by an administrative body.
A second type of city ordinance found in about nine cities deals
generally with publicly assisted housing (FHA- or VA-insured or state
assisted) and urban redevelopment (URA)." 4 These measures are
essentially like those found in several of the states. They forbid dis-
crimination on the basis of race or color in housing accommodations of
a stipulated number of units or tract homes located on contiguous land.
A third type of measure deals with public housing projects (PHA).148
144 N.Y. Times, October 12, 1959.
145 Martin v. N.Y.C. Comm'n on Intergroup Relations, 143 N.Y.L.J. 13 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1960).
146 4 Race Rel. L. Rep. 195 (1959). The ordinance was approved December 8, 1958,
and supplements an earlier ordinance prohibiting discrimination in employment. See 1
Race Rel. L. Rep. 746 (1956).
147 The cities are: Los Angeles, Sacramento and San Francisco, California; Hartford,
Connecticut; Des Moines, Iowa; Superior Township, Michigan; Minneapolis and St. Paul,
Minnesota; and Cincinnati and Cleveland, Ohio. Compiled in materials cited at notes 131
and 140 supra.
148 The cities are: Phoenix, Arizona; Fresno, Richmond and San Francisco, California;
Hartford, Connecticut; Wilmington, Delaware; Washington, D.C.; Chicago, Illinois; South
Bend, Indiana; Baltimore, Maryland; Boston, Massachusetts; Pontiac and Superior Town-
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At present, approximately twenty-seven cities have ordinances or regula-
tions dealing solely with public housing. Many of the cities included in
the public housing group have expanded their regulatory scheme to
other housing.
As noted, many of the cities have preceded the states in enacting fair
housing legislation. Much of what has been done by the states was based
on the experience of municipalities. It has been suggested that the
matter of fair housing is not a problem that can be adequately remedied
at the city level; that the presence of city regulation, especially where
there is state regulation, presents possible questions of duplication of
regulation, or even conflict. More importantly, the argument runs, city
regulation may well raise questions of the extent of a municipality's
police power and, more specifically, its power to declare civil rights or
to cut down existing rights.149 Other have recommended greater munici-
pal activity with respect to fair housing measures.150
The governmental power most directly felt by a citizen is that nearest
him, a municipality. Also, the impact of social problems on government,
especially those of a domestic and localized nature, is first felt by the
governmental unit nearest it, again, a municipality. And in the housing
field, the problem is first discerned in the population centers-the cities.
It seems, therefore, that the governmental unit nearest the problem,
ship, Michigan; Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota; St. Louis, Missouri; Omaha, Ne-
braska; Newark, New Jersey; Cleveland and Toledo, Ohio; Chester, Delaware County,
Erie and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Providence, Rhode Island; Pasco, Washington; and
Superior, Wisconsin. See also, materials cited supra notes 131 and 140.
149 See, Note, supra note 141, at 533-35. And see, Comment, "Validity of Municipal
Law Barring Discrimination in Private Housing," 58 Colum. L. Rev. 728 (1958), con-
cluding that the New York ordinance, discussed above, is constitutionally valid. Munic-
ipal home rule, to be sure, often times presents problems of legislative jurisdiction, but in
each of the states under their respective method of empowering municipalities to act, there
is an area where cities may act in respect of local housing problems. In California, for
example, the authority of cities and counties to enact ordinances pertaining to housing is
found in two state constitutional provisions. Art. XI § 11, provides:
Any county, city, town or township may make and enforce within its limits all such
local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.
Authorizing the formation of cities and towns under freeholders' charters, art. XI, § 6,
provides in part:
Cities and towns hereafter organized under charters framed and adopted by
authority of this Constitution are hereby empowered ... to make and enforce all
laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to the restrictions
and limitations provided in their several charters, and in respect to other matters
they shall be subject to and controlled by general laws.
Jurisdictionally, then, it seems that non-chartered California cities may enact housing
legislation, limited only to the extent that such regulation does not conflict with general law.
And with chartered cities, the limitation seems to be that the regulation, i.e., housing
legislation, must constitute a municipal affair and not subject to limitations or restrictions in
individual charters. See, McCarty, Local Regulation of Housing Conditions in California
(Bureau of Pub. Adm., Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, June 1958).
150 See, Committee on Integration in Housing, "The Need for a Comprehensive Anti-
Discrimination Law," 18 Law. Guild Rev. 26 (1958) and materials cited at note 168 infra.
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experiencing the attendant consequences of an overcrowded area, of
ghettos and slums, is probably best qualified to act in the circumstances.
Moreover, the problems of a particular city may be such that a state-
wide program would serve little use. A city's problems may well be
peculiar to it, and through local regulation the remedy can be tailored
to meet the need. The recent hearings of the United States Commission
on Civil Rights in several cities on the housing problem laid bare this
fact.' 5
Validity of State and City Fair Housing Laws
The residuum of governmental power under which states may enact
fair housing laws is the police power. Its limits are incapable of precise
delineation. The approach followed in Houston v. Moore,52 an early case,
perhaps best illustrates the penumbral area of state power. The Court
listed three general areas in which states are powerless to act: (1) where
the power is lodged exclusively in the federal constitution; (2) where
it is given to the United States and prohibited to the states; and (3)
where, from the nature and subject matter of the power, it must
necessarily be exercised by the federal government. In addition to these
prohibitions or limitations and the limitations included in the respective
state constitutions, there are two additional constitutional proscriptions
on the exercise of the police power-the equal protection and due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
A. Due Process
Because of the reach and scope of police power, being neither suscep-
tible of precise delineation nor definable by any talismanic formula, due
process limitations on the power may be determined by examining the
subject matter which occasions its exercise.5 3 Broad generalizations,
fundamental principles and notions of justice, fair play and liberty,
deeply rooted in the traditions of the English-speaking world, can
only be applied on an instance-by-instance, case-by-case approach.
It is generally stated that the due process proscriptions do not proscribe
state regulation per se, but merely require that the means employed must
not be arbitrary or oppressive; they must bear a reasonable relation to a
governmental objective such as the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare.'54 It is not enough merely to invoke such doctrinal
151 See note 103 supra.
152 5 Wheat. 1 (1820).
153 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Queenside Hills Realty Co. v Saxl, 328 U.S.
80 (1946); Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135
(1922). And see Hetherington, "State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process
of Law", 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 13, 226 (1958); Paulsen, "The Persistence of Substantive Due
Process in the States", 18 Ohio St. L.J. 384 (1957).
154 See cases cited note 153 supra, and see, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Pub. Util.
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terms as "reasonably necessary," "general welfare" or "health, safety
and morals" when testing a police measure. A doctrinaire or concep-
tualistic approach merely begs the question. What is necessary is a
detailed enumeration of the facts or factors which imperil the tran-
quillity of the community and thus provide occasion for the exercise of
this power. Typically, the New York Fair Housing Ordinance listed
the relevant factors which prompted the municipality to act:
In the City of New York, with its great cosmopolitan population consist-
ing of large numbers of people of every race, color, religion, national origin
and ancestry, many persons have been compelled to live in circumscribed
sections under substandard, unhealthful, unsanitary and crowded living
conditions because of discrimination in housing. These conditions have
caused increased mortality, morbidity, delinquency, risk of fire, intergroup
tension, loss of tax revenue and other evils. As a result, the peace, health,
safety and general welfare of the city and all its inhabitants are threat-
ened. Such segregation in housing also necessarily results in other forms of
segregation and discrimination which are against the policy of the state of
New York. It results in racial segregation in public schools and other
public facilities, which is condemned by the constitutions of our state and
nation. In order to guard against these evils, it is necessary to assure to all
inhabitants of the city equal opportunity to obtain living quarters, regard-
less of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry. 155
By articulating the reasons and factors which gave rise to the occasion
for the exertion of power, its validity can be more readily tested. It is
no longer open to question that upon review great weight is accorded
the findings of a legislature, and that a court will not sit as a super
legislature or substitute its judgment for that of a lawmaking body.15 6
Legislative enactments are deemed presumptively constitutional, and
only where it is shown that the legislative action is arbitrary or unrea-
sonable will the courts invalidate it. 5 7 Therefore, in determining the
validity of the several state and municipal fair housing laws, it is
instructive to examine some of the decisions discussing the validity or
invalidity of police measures in similar or related areas.
Public Accommodations Measures. Presently, twenty-one states, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have statutes
prohibiting owners and operators of places of public accommodation
from discriminating on racial or religious grounds in the admission of
guests, and prohibiting public advertisements designed to discourage
Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953); Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) ;
Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union
v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236
(1941) ; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
155 Preamble to New York City Ordinance, supra note 142.
156 See cases cited in notes 153 and 154 supra.
157 Ibid., and see Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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patronage of certain groups because of race or religion.158 The courts in
eleven states where these laws have been contested have uniformly held
them to be valid." 9 As early as 1898, the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
in upholding the Minnesota law, summarily remarked:
The power of the legislature to enact... [a civil rights statute] as to all
kinds of business, of a public or quasi-public character, conducted for the
accommodation, refreshment, amusement or instruction of the public, which
the state has the right to regulate under its police power, so that all classes
of citizens may enjoy the benefit thereof without unjust discrimination,
is no longer open to discussion.'6 0
And in 1953, when the issue of the validity of the District of Columbia's
public accommodations law was considered by the United States Supreme
Court, it too treated the issue as no longer open:
And certainly so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned there is no
doubt that legislation which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race
in the use of facilities serving a public function is within the police power
of the states.161
Fair Employment Practices Measures. Many states have enacted laws
prohibiting discrimination in employment.'62 Similarly, those laws which
have been contested on the state level have been uniformly upheld. 6
And in Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi,'6 4 where the issue of the applicability
of the New York FEPC Law to a labor union was before the Court,
the measure was upheld as a valid exercise of the police power. 65
These laws restrict personal liberties, but in balancing the relative
interests-on the one hand, liberty of contract and right of choice of one's
158 The statutes are compiled in 2 Emerson & Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the
United States 1405-22 (2d ed. 1958), and see the amended California statute, supra
note 120.
159 Jones v. Kehrlein, 49 Cal. App. 646, 194 Pac. 55 (1920); Darius v. Apostolos, 68
Colo. 323, 190 Pac. 510 (1920); Baylies v. Curry, 128 Ill. 287, 21 N.E. 595 (1889);
Fruchey v. Eagleson, 15 Ind. App. 88, 43 N.E. 146 (1895); Brown v. J.H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa
89, 123 N.W. 231 (1909); Decuir v. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1 (1875), rev'd on other grounds,
95 U.S. 487 (1878); Ferguson v. Giles, 82 Mich. 358, 46 N.W. 638 (1890); Rhone v. Loomis,
74 Minn. 200 (1898); People v. King, 110 N.Y. 418 (1888).
160 Rhone v. Loomis, supra note 159, at 203.
101 District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109 (1953).
102 2 Emerson & Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the United States 1463-82 (2d ed.
1958). See generally Morgan, "An Analysis of State FEPC Legislation," 8 Lab. L.J. 469
(1957); Murray, "The Right to Equal Opportunity in Employment," 33 Calif. L. Rev.
388 (1945).
163 Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, 208 Misc. 622, 144 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1955), aff'd,
1 App. Div. 2d 950, 150 N.Y.S.2d 367, motion for reargument denied, 2 App. Div. 2d 664,
153 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1st Dep't 1956); Holland v. Edwards, 282 App. Div. 353, 122 N.Y.S.2d
721 (1st Dep't 1953), aff'd mem., 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954); Ross v. Arbury, 206
Misc. 74, 133 N.Y.S.2d 62, aff'd, 285 App. Div. 886, 139 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1st Dep't 1954);
Ivory v. Edwards, 278 App. Div. 359, 105 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd mem., 304
N.Y. 949, 110 N.E.2d 887 (1953); Tilley v. Local 35, 18 Conn. Supp. 125 (1952); Draper v.
Clark, 17 Conn. Supp. 93 (1950). In Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945)
the constitutional validity of the state's FEPC laws was assumed by the Court.
164 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
165 See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion id. at 97-99. Cf. materials cited
note 162 supra.
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patrons in a place of public accommodation and, on the other, the attend-
ant evils of discrimination as to certain minority groups-the latter
interest has been uniformly held to outweigh the former.
Emergency Rent Control Measures. The emergency rent cases present
a strong parallel to the fair housing laws. In Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel,'66
the validity of the New York Emergency Housing Law was questioned.
The legislature had found that a shortage of dwelling space and the
consequent overcrowding were leading to unsanitary conditions, disease,
immorality, and widespread discontent. To remedy this evil, landlords
were prohibited from evicting tenants. Over strong argument that the rela-
tion of landlord and tenant is a private one and not so affected by the
public interest as to justify its subjection to regulation, the Court upheld
the law.167
As stated earlier, almost all of the fair housing laws have a history of
gradual, piecemeal enactment. As new problems developed, the states
endeavored to remedy the evils with new measures. These enactments
represent efforts on the part of the states to meet and solve admitted
problems. 6" It may be that "sociology is not law";' 69 nevertheless, law
is an instrument by means of which sociological problems may be
remedied or alleviated.
In the housing field, then, as in other areas, the validity of regulation
depends upon whether, on balance, the interest of landlords or property
owners in the lease or sale of their property is outweighed by the need
to secure to all, without regard to race or religion, an opportunity to
acquire a place to live.
B. Equal Protection
Mr. Justice Holmes remarked that the equal protection clause is the
"usual last refuge of constitutional arguments .... ,t17 Although this
166 Supra note 153.
167 The Court thereby reaffirmed its holdings in two earlier rent control cases, Block
v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), and Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921).
168 See, for example, Abrams, Forbidden Neighbors (1955); Myrdal, An American
Dilemma, chs. 13-14 (1944); Linder, "The Social Results of Segregation in Housing", 18
Law. Guild Rev. 2 (1958). For legal discussions, see, "Publicly-Owned Facilities, Housing,
and Transportation: Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights," 54 Nw U.L. Rev. 377, 381-88
(1959); Frey, "'Freedom of Residence' in Illinois," 41 Chi. B. Rec. 9 (1959); Saks &
Rabkin, "Racial and Religious Discrimination in Housing," 45 Iowa L. Rev. 488 (1960);
Comment, "Anti-Discrimination Legislation as It Affects Real Property Rights," 23 Al-
bany L. Rev. 75 (1958); Comment, "Validity of Municipal Law Barring Discrimina-
tion in Private Housing," supra note 149; Comment, "The New Jersey Housing Anti-Bias
Law: Applicability To Non-State-Aided Developments," 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 557 (1958);
Comment, "Discrimination in Housing," 57 Yale L.J. 426 (1948); Note, supra note 141;
Note, 33 Notre Dame L. Rev. 463 (1958).
169 O'Teara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination, supra note 72, at 4, and
see Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 463 (1950).
170 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
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observation is widely accepted,'171 police measures must, nevertheless,
comport with the requirements of this clause.
The due process and equal protection clauses harmonize and share
much in common, but their respective interdictions are not coterminous.
The former "tends to secure equality in law in the sense that it makes a
required minimum of protection for everyone's right of life, liberty, and
property, which the Congress or legislature may not withhold.... The
guaranty [of the latter] was aimed at undue favor and individual or
class privilege . . . and at hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality... 172 In short, as stated in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,173
"the prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the
invidious discrimination."
The equal protection clause, then, does not disable state or local
governmental units from dealing with a local, domestic problem; it
merely requires that the impact of such regulation fall, in terms of
operation and effect, upon all of the inhabitants of the state or locality
equally except where there exists some reasonable basis for differentia-
tion .1 4 This is a requirement that police measures be just in the sense
that they must, among other things, be equal in application and operation
in so far as is practical under the circumstances.
The rules for testing the equal protection validity of police measures
have been summarized as follows:
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws,
but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard,
and avoids what is done only when . . . [there is no reasonable basis]
and therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against
that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety
or because in practice it results in some inequality.
3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state
of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence
of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.
4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden
of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is
essentially arbitrary.175
171 See, Tussman & tenBroek, "The Equal Protection of the Laws," 37 Calif. L. Rev.
341 (1949).
172 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332-33 (1921). See also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
178 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
174 Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., supra note
173; Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Takahashi v. Fish
& Game Comm., 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Buck
v. Bell, supra note 170; Truax v. Corrigan, supra note 172; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886). See also Tussman & tenBroek, "The Equal Protection of the Laws,"
supra note 171.
175 Morey v. Doud, supra note 174, at 463.
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Under the fair housing laws, there are three primary classifications and,
consequently, three problems: (1) the classification of commercial
property owners as opposed to individual home owners; (2) the classifi-
cation of publicly assisted property owners as opposed to conventional
owners; and (3) the classification of brokers, realtors and agents as a
group. Under these laws, in the main, only those units are covered which
constitute a large part of the housing market. Multiple dwellings of a
minimum number of units, developments of a minimum number of
tract houses situated on contiguous land, and those persons who engaged
in the business of selling or leasing property for a livelihood, are the
general classifications established for regulatory purposes. It may be
pointed out here also that the type of housing covered under the typical
fair housing law is the type a majority of the populace inhabit in large
urban centers. In New York City, for example, multiple dwellings consti-
tute approximately 70 per cent (approximately 1,700,000 apartments)
of the city's housing market .1 7 In addition, many new settiers-includ-
ing persons of minority racial, religious and ethnic groups-seek
living accommodations first in low rent housing or multiple dwelling
units.
The classification of commercial landlords for regulatory purposes,
in view of the admittedly great demand for housing accommodations
and the present shortage of supply,'77 would appear to be reasonable.
Commercial landlords, as opposed to private landlords, are by definition
engaged in the business of furnishing housing accommodations as a
profit-making activity, while the private owner is not. The two are not
in competition. And to regulate the commercial owners does not accord
to the private owners an advantage or privilege they would not, but for
the regulation, have otherwise enjoyed. A classifiation, then, based on a
business activity which affects a substantial portion of the general public,
as did the milk producers in Nebbia, the opticians in Lee Optical Co.,
the express money service in Morey v. Doud and the landlords in Block
v. Hirsh, would appear to be a valid basis for regulation.
The classification of landlords receiving assistance presents two
problems: (1) classification for regulatory purposes, and (2) the
character of financial assistance as a basis for judicial relief.'78
The classification of publicly assisted landlords as a special group
must be tested by the same guides as any other classification. Except for
the source and type of financing, publicly assisted landlords are no
176 See Note, 33 Notre Dame L. Rev. 463 at 478 n.77 (1958).
177 See note 13 supra.
178 See discussion in text beginning at note 66 supra.
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different from private landowners using conventional finance methods.
The inquiry, then, is whether the method of financing provides a suffi-
cient basis for classification. The New York Supreme Court, adopting a
rule fashioned in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 179 in S.C.A.D. v. Pelham
Hall Apartments'80 upheld a "publicly assisted" classification under the
New York statute. The court held that a state may carve out a group of
persons, with similar characteristics, whose numbers and activities are
such as to create a greater need for immediate regulation than others,
although similar, in the broader group. In short, it held that a state may
take a "step-at-a-time" approach to reform.'
In Levitt v. Division Against Discrimination in State Department of
Education,' the Supreme Court of New Jersey, upholding the New
Jersey statute, detailed the various forms of assistance the developers
received and held the classification to be reasonable. The FHA had
committed itself to insure mortgages made by purchasers. It was
necessary for FHA to approve the site and to set up requirements con-
cerning drainage, street layouts, parks, curbs, sidewalks, utilities, includ-
ing water and sewage disposal, driveways, entrance walks and the like.
During the course of construction, FHA inspectors made periodic inspec-
tions. And, because of the size of the development, an FHA inspector
was maintained at the site of the development full time during construc-
tion. The developers conceded that, were they not assured of this
assistance, they would not have undertaken the project. The court held,
following a different approach from that taken in Pelham Hall Apart-
ments, that these factors justified singling out publicly assisted land-
lords for purposes of regulation.' The court noted that "the clear and
positive policy" against discrimination embodied in the State's Consti-
tution, article I, required a liberal interpretation of enactments designed
to implement it, and it rejected the argument that the legislature could
not carve out a segment of landowners or developers for regulatory
purposes without covering all.
It was also argued that state regulation of federally assisted housing
179 Supra note 173.
180 10 Misc. 2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1958).
181 Although the court relied heavily on the approach adopted in the Williamson
case, the general tenor of the opinion seems to be that the classification was viewed
quantitatively rather than qualitatively. I.e., the court was influenced by the amount of the
involvement and assistance under the New York statute rather than the fact and nature of
the assistance. The proper test it seems is qualitative-the fact and nature of assistance.
Where there is public assistance, whether federal, state or local, there should then be a
proper basis for classification and regulation. See Comment, "Builder of FHA Housing
Held Barred From Discriminating Against Purchasers on Basis of Race: Possible Sources
of Federal Prohibition and Basis for Cause of Action," supra note 70.
182 31 NJ. 514, 158 A.2d 177, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 418 (1960).
183 The court seems to have employed a qualitative test rather than a quantitative test.
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invaded a field of regulation pre-empted by Congress and, therefore,
prohibited under the supremacy clause of the federal constitution.
Rejecting this argument, the court answered: "There is a considerable
gap between Congress' refusing to adopt an express policy of non-dis-
crimination in regard to FHA insured housing, to be applicable under
all circumstances and in all sections of the country, and a congressional
policy prohibiting states from enacting laws proscribing such discrimina-
tion. ,"1 8
4
In O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination,' the
owner of a single-family residence advertised his home for sale. The
home was approximately twenty-four years old and had been purchased
by O'Meara in 1955. It was financed through a private loan insured by
the FHA. Under the Washington fair housing law, all forms of publicly
assisted housing are covered.
Pursuant to the advertisement, Robert L. Jones, a Negro, visited and
inspected the home. Thereafter he, along with his attorney, left with
O'Meara a signed earnest money receipt contemplating a sale for the
requested price "all cash to seller on closing." The earnest money receipt
was accompanied by a check for $1,000, as a down payment.
Upon O'Meara's refusal to sell to Jones, even after an order by the
Washington State Board Against Discrimination, the matter went to
court, where it was argued that the classification set up in the fair
housing law was unreasonable and therefore a denial of equal protection
of the laws. Upholding this contention, the court stated:
There is no reason to suppose that persons with FHA mortgages on their
homes are more likely to discriminate against minority groups than those
who have conventional mortgages or no mortgages, or those who are pur-
chasing upon contract. This act would prohibit Commander O'Meara from
doing what his neighbors are at perfect liberty to do. It gives to those who
have conventional mortgages, or no mortgages, and those who are buying
upon contract, special privileges and immunities which are not accorded
to him. 8 6
The court therefore struck down the Washington statute.
8 7
The flaw in the court's reasoning is that it assumed other similar but
unregulated landowners have a right to discriminate. In the Civil Rights
Case, s8 it was held that Congress could not interdict individual action
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, and that under this
provision, Congress could only enact corrective legislation designed to
184 31 N.J. 514, 535, 158 A.2d 177, 188 (1960).
185 Supra note 72.
186 Id. at 8.
187 The case is now on appeal to the Supreme Court of Washington.
188 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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relieve against action by states. Where there is individual discrimination,
not furthered by a state in any form, Congress under section 5 is
powerless to act. But Washington or any other state may interdict any
discrimination it considers a threat or harmful to the peace and order of
the community.18 9 States have historically acted in myriad situations to
protect or regulate the activities of individuals in their relationship with
other individuals. There is then no basis for the distinction the court
made in striking down the classification. As has been seen, when Congress
entered the housing field, its objective was to stimulate home building
and buying. And to do this, it, among other things, placed at the
disposal of those availing themselves of the benefits of the housing
program, a security guaranteeing payment that could not be duplicated
by any private business or engagement. It thereby gave those availing
themselves of the assistance an added advantage in the housing market
which they would not-or indeed could not-otherwise enjoy. This factor
it seems, without more, provides a constitutionally valid basis on which
a state may bottom regulation under its police power.' 90
C. Criticisms and Proposals
As can be readily gleaned from the illustrations, many of the state
laws have basic common features. Eight of the laws are enforced by an
administrative agency. This method of enforcement seems most suitable
because of the nature of the problem. Immediate relief is important.
Delay or a cumbersome procedure merely weakens enforcement and
discourages those aggrieved from seeking relief.
It is interesting to note, with respect to the California act, which
provides merely for court relief, that it was enacted at the same legisla-
tive session at which California's new FEPC law was enacted, which is
administered by a board created in the act.' 91 Many states which have
both an FEPC law and a fair housing law have empowered the same
board to administer both laws. This practice seems desirable because
of the similarity of the two problems. Moreover, in general, those states
acting through an administrative board have not experienced any
frustration of their objectives under their fair housing laws because of
administrative enforcement.192
189 In In re Kimmler, 136 U.S. 436, at 439 (1890), the Court stated:
Protection of life, liberty and property rests, primarily, with the States, and the
[Fourteenth] [Almendment furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroach-
ment by the states upon those fundamental rights which belong to citizenship, and
which the state governments were created to secure.
190 See Comment, "Builder of FHA Housing Held Barred From Discriminating Against
Purchasers on Basis of Race: Possible Source of Federal Prohibition And Basis for Cause
of Action," supra note 70.
191 Supra note 119, § 1414.
192 Under the Massachusetts Fair Housing Act, discussed in text accompanying note
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The approach taken by the State of Oregon may well be instructive
for other states. Much of the problem of discrimination against certain
racial and religious minorities in the matter of securing housing accom-
modations is due to the activities of those who deal in real estate as a
business or occupation. It would not require a complete repeal of the
present common method of regulating the sale or rental of housing
accommodations to add proscriptions directly against realtors and others
engaged in the business. Realtors constitute a class and are regulated
in other aspects of their business by the states. Hence, it would seem
that they could be required to do or refrain from doing certain acts
-namely, they could be prohibited from engaging in discriminatory
practices in the sale or lease of property. This proscription, applying
only to a distinct group, would greatly influence the practices of the
housing market in a particular state or locality. It could also be effec-
tively utilized in those states which are reluctant to regulate private
housing directly.
From its investigation and study, the United States Commission on
Civil Rights found:
[W]hatever the particular approach adopted, some official city and state
program and agency concerned with promoting equal opportunity to decent
housing is needed. Such programs and agencies can bring about better
public understanding of the problems and better communication between
citizens. Whether or not cities or states are prepared to adopt antidiscrimi-
nation laws, and even in areas where racial separation is the prevailing
public policy, it is possible that through interracial negotiation practical
agreements for progress in housing can be reached. Where public opinion
makes possible the adoption of laws against discrimination in housing,
this might contribute significantly to the work of the agency promoting
equal opportunity in housing. Then the agency would have legal support
in its efforts at mediation and conciliation. 193
The Commission therefore recommended:
... that an appropriate biracial committee or commission on housing be
established in every city and state with a substantial nonwhite population.
Such agencies should be empowered to study racial problems in housing,
receive and investigate complaints alleging discrimination, attempt to solve
107 supra, the first two reported cases to arise under the 1959 amendments were dismissed
through administrative settlement. The first complaint involved a Negro complainant who
charged that a certain real estate operator refused to lease accommodations to a white
friend, with whom the complainant contemplated sharing quarters. The second complaint
was essentially the same as the first, and against the same realty firm. The cases were
disposed of within ten days after the complaints were filed. Reported by MCAD Comm'r
Carrington, 3 'Trends in Housing, September-October 1959, No. 5, p. 1. In the housing
field as with employment, immediate relief-if one is to get effective relief-is necessary, and
this, it seems, can best be given by or through administrative machinery. But cf. Burks
v. Poppy Constr. Co., and Gerrish v. Shattuck, supra note 129, and Pearson v. Frumenti,
supra note 127, where temporary court relief was granted under the California fair
housing law.
193 Supra note 2, at 182.
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problems through mediation and conciliation, and consider whether these
agencies should be strengthened by the enactment of legislation for equal
opportunity in areas of housing deemed advisable. 194
III. FEDERAL, STATE AND CITY ADMINISTRATIVE APPROACHES TO
DECENT, NONDISCRIMINATORY HOUSING AND THEIR TIMELINESS
Federal and State Regulation of Home Financing Institutions
The federal government is involved in many ways with housing which
is customarily considered privately owned. Savings and loan associa-
tions, incorporated under federal statutes,' 95 provide mortgage financ-
ing to individual and corporate builders and buyers. Banks which finance
mortgages on housing constructed without other federal assistance or
insurance are customarily members of the Federal Reserve System' 96
and their deposits are protected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration. 1 97 These services by the federal government cast the govern-
ment in the role of participant in what would otherwise be nongovern-
mental transactions, and the proscription against denials of equal pro-
tection might logically be held to apply to home financing activities of
federal savings and loan associations and banks which are members
of FDIC and the Federal Reserve System. Such federal assistance
programs, which accord to these institutions added business advantages
they could not otherwise secure privately, provide a basis for legislative
or administrative regulation of their home financing.
The Civil Rights Commission heard testimony on the current practice
of many banks and savings and loan associations of refusing to finance
a mortgage on the first minority owned housing in a previously exclusive
area. 98 Administrative or legislative action, as proposed, could aid in
the elimination of this restrictive practice. One step was taken in this
direction early in 1960 when the Superintendent of Banks for New York
State "respectfully suggested" to all lending institutions subject to his
supervision that they refrain from any practices "which would give rise,
directly or indirectly, to any justifiable inference that loan applications
are being considered, and the disposition thereof is being made, upon
[the basis of applicant's race, creed, color or national origin.]' 199
Testimony before the Civil Rights Commission also reflected discrim-
inatory practices by fire and casualty companies in setting higher pre-
194 Id. at 182-83.
195 48 Stat. 132 (1934), 12 U.S.C. 1464 (1958); 48 Stat. 1256 (1935), 12 U.S.C. 1725,
1726 (1958). States also regulate banks and savings and loan associations: E.g., Cal. Fin.
Code §§ 5000-71, 5500-6010 (Deering 1953).
196 38 Stat. 259 (1917), 12 U.S.C. 321-38 (1958), as amended.
197 48 Stat. 168 (1913), 12 U.S.C. 1813-31 (1958).
198 1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 740.
199 Trends in Housing, Jan.-Feb. 1960, p. 5.
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miums for insurance on property owned by minority group members in
previously all-white areas, and in ghettos."° Under the decisions in the
Restrictive Covenant cases,20 state courts could not enforce such con-
tracts, since the purpose of the inflated premiums is to discourage or
deny equal housing opportunities to all prospective purchasers without
regard to race, color, or national origin.
State Regulation of Licensed Real Estate Operators
The United States Commission of Civil Rights heard extensive testi-
mony on the role of some real estate operators in causing panic selling
by whites and buying by minority group members at inflated prices.202
The classic pattern was described in a recent federal injunction pro-
ceeding in Illinois:
The whole community was thrown into an uproar .. .when it became
known to the officials and citizens of Deerfield that some of the houses that
plaintiffs proposed to build would be sold to Negroes and other non-
Caucasians. The court finds, however, that the ensuing turmoil was not
caused solely by the fact that the public had been informed of the proposed
sale of houses to Negroes. The court finds that immediately after the
revelation of that news, the residents of Deerfield were bombarded with
telephone offers to purchase their homes at prices ranging from 50 to 75
per cent of their actual cost or fair market value. There is no credible
evidence of the identity of the persons responsible for those calls. The
only finding the court can and does make relative thereto is that it was
a quickly organized campaign carried on by persons, highly skilled in the
procedure, who practice it in various areas in and around Chicago where
white and colored communities adjoin each other.203
A recent survey of the practices of realtors in San Francisco indicated
that realtors insisted on the continuation of racial segregation in housing
even when their clients had no objections to leasing or selling to members
of minority groups.204 Testimony before the Civil Rights Commission
in Atlanta, Chicago and San Francisco emphasized the "gentleman's
agreements" among real estate dealers not to "sell or rent to a nonwhite
in any block, until the block has been 'cracked' by the presence of a
Negro family there by some other means." And to add force to these
agreements, dealers violating their terms have been penalized by their
respective groups. 5
200 1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 741. See N.Y. Unconsol. Laws Ch. 18 (McKinney 1960),
forbidding insurance companies to discriminate in writing life insurance because of race,
color, creed or national origin.
201 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
202 1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 224, 882-83.
203 Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681, 705-06 (E.D. Ill. 1960). And see
1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 226.
204 Thomas & Babow, "San Francisco's Housing Market-Open or Closed? Civil
rights inventory of San Francisco," (Council for Civic Unity, 437 Market St., S.F. 1960).
205 1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 882. Examples of agreements among realtors in Atlanta,
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In many instances, however, realtor organizations have adopted or
included in their codes of practices a provision prohibiting member
realtors from engaging in discriminatory selling practices. 06 While this
of course is desirable and will no doubt influence the practices of many
real estate operators, the positive results inuring therefrom are realized
merely as a by-product of the negative interdictions. These organiza-
tions could go further: They could adopt resolutions or by-laws enjoin-
ing their members to cooperate with local officials and community groups
engaged in effectuating fair housing practices. Thus, by placing a duty
upon their members to take positive steps to lend their influence and
assistance to local governmental and private groups concerned with fair
housing problems, these organizations would achieve positive results
through positive means, while at the same time discharging the duties
of their profession.
States too may act to regulate the selling and leasing practices of
realtors. At least one state has so acted. Oregon, amending its fair
housing law, now prohibits discriminatory selling and leasing practices
of realtors licensed in the state. 0 7 Two other states, Maryland2 8 and
New York, 00 have adopted a new regulatory policy under existing law.
In those states disciplinary action may be taken to suspend or revoke the
licenses of realtors engaged in discriminatory practices in racially chang-
ing neighborhoods, particularly "block-busting." The Philadelphia Com-
mission on Human Relations has requested the Pennsylvania Real Es-
tate Licensing Commission to take similar action.210 In California, the
state attorney general has issued an opinion stating that realtors are
subject to the provisions of the recently amended public accommoda-
tions statute in selling and leasing housing accommodations. 211 Similar
at 1 Hearings 441-53; in Chicago, at 1 Hearings 882-83; in New York, at 1 Hearings
395-96; in San Francisco, in U.S. Civil Rights Comm'n Hearings in San Francisco,
reported in S.F. Chronicle, Jan. 28, 1960, p. 1. And see Beddoe v. Southeast Realty Board,
discussed infra text accompanying note 247.
206 E.g., San Jose Real Estate Board policy, reported in S.F. Chronicle, Jan. 28, 1960,
p. 19; Santa Clara County Contractors and Home Builders Ass'n policy, Trends in
Housing, May-June 1960, p. 4.
207 See discussion in text at note 117 supra.
208 Trends in Housing, May-June 1959, p. 8.
209 Action by New York Secretary of State under N.Y. Real Prop. Law, § 441-C,
reported in Trends in Housing, Sept.-Oct. 1959, p. 6. N.Y. secretary of state and N.Y.
rent commissioner, on complaints from Negro tenants, agreed Feb. 18, 1960, to refer all
complaints against real estate brokers, for charging illegal fees or bonuses for finding
apartments, to the state Division of Licenses for action. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1960.
210 Trends in Housing, Sept.-Oct. 1959, p. 6.
211 See supra note 128. The attorney general of California has also ruled that a
redevelopment agency is barred by the Fourteenth Amendment from including in listings of
available relocation housing any landlords who refuse to accept members of minority groups
as tenants. The redevelopment agency is a state governmental agency authorized to function
in the various communities to acquire property for the purpose of improving, rehabilitating
and redeveloping blighted areas. As an incidental duty, such agencies are required to
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opinions have been issued by the attorney general of Massachusetts and
the Connecticut Civil Rights Commission.212 In Michigan, after six
days of hearings before the Corporations and Securities Commission on
a "point system" operated to keep the Grosse Pointe area "exclusive,"
the attorney general condemned the practice and the Commission pro-
mulgated a new rule June 30, 1960 prohibiting brokers and salesmen
from refusing to sell, buy, appraise, list or lease any real estate "because
of the race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry of any person or
persons.21" The Chairman of the Massachusetts Board of Registration
of Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen took similar action in July 1960.14
On this point Commissioners Hesburgh and Johnson added a footnote
to the report of the Civil Rights Commission:
We wish to add that in line with the Commission's recommendation for
biracial committees, it would be helpful if all real estate boards admitted
qualified Negroes to membership. In view of the important role real estate
boards play in determining housing policies and patterns throughout a
community, we believe these boards are not merely private associations
but are clothed with the public interest and that the constitutional principle
of nondiscrimination, applicable to all parts of our public life, should be
followed. With white and Negro realtors meeting and working together,
misunderstandings could be cleared up and there would be greater pos-
sibility of solving racial housing problems through negotiation, under-
standing, and good will. 21
5
County Refusal to Record Racial Restrictive Covenants
In Shelley v. Kraemer2 10 the Court held that enforcement of racial
restrictive covenants by state courts constitutes state action within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment and is violative of the equal pro-
tection clause. This decision did not, however, purport to prohibit
establish a practical method for the relocation of persons displaced by urban renewal
projects, and therefore maintain relocation bureaus to assist displaced persons in securing
other adequate housing. Under the attorney general's opinion, landlords who engage in
discriminatory practices may no longer be listed with the relocation bureau as having
accommodations available for such displaced persons. The attorney general opined that,
because of the public expenditure to maintain a listing, such service could not be used by
those who discriminated against certain tenants consistently with the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See American Jewish Congress, Joint Memo, No.
281, Dec. 4, 1959.
212 American Jewish Congress, Joint Memo, No. 282, Jan. 1, 1960; No. 150, Feb. 10,
1956.
213 5 Race Rel. L. Rep. 567 (1960). For fifteen years the Grosse Pointe Brokers
Association and Grosse Pointe Property Owners Association, representing 973 families,
followed a rigid point system for screening families wanting to build or buy in the area,
with 50 as a passing score for some, but Jews needing 85 points, Greeks--65, Poles---55.
Negroes and Orientals were automatically rated zero. Points were based on ancestry,
name, accent, religion, complexion, dress, grammar, friends, way of life ("Is it typically
American?") Trends in Housing, Mar.-Apr. 1960, p. 3.
214 5 Race Rel. L. Rep. 253 (1960).
215 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 183.
216 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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homeowners from making such covenants, nor from attempting to en-
force them by other nongovernmental means.
Testimony before the Civil Rights Commission described fourteen
areas in and near the District of Columbia in which it is well known that
members of certain racial and religious minority groups are excluded
as owners or as occupants of dwellings through use of such covenants. 17
In many areas throughout the country owners continue to sign deeds
containing explicit and detailed restrictive covenants.21 8 While the
courts will no longer enforce these covenants, it may be assumed that
they still possess some extra-legal force or they would no longer appear
in deeds to be recorded. It may be now that they are nothing more than
"gentlemen's agreements," dependent upon the good faith and the prom-
ises of the parties agreeing thereto, but their continued use and presence
frustrate many local voluntary efforts to effectuate fair housing prac-
tices.
Whatever force they still have would be dissipated by the refusal of
county recorders to accept such instruments for recording. The Court
in Shelley v. Kraemer stated that "so long as the purpose of those agree-
ments are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would
appear clear that there has been no action by the state and the provisions
of the Amendments have not been violated." 19 But the recording of
such instruments by the state is not voluntary adherence; it is state
action and, as such, is forbidden by the equal protection clause.
It is suggested therefore that a recorder of deeds may decline to
record an instrument containing a racial restrictive covenant on the
basis of the decision in the Restrictive Covenant cases. And should a
property owner or group seek to compel the recordation by court action,
such relief would be foreclosed under the Restrictive Covenant cases.
Such action by recorders of deeds would appear to be valid. By pro-
viding a recordation service to property owners the states thus provide
a ready public record of the status of each owner's property. This
record or its contents, by reflecting the status of property, makes pos-
sible the determination of its transferability and marketability. In
addition, recordation is a public service, operated with public funds,
and the recorder's office being a state agency, its facilities cannot be
utilized for a purpose contrary to the interdictions of the equal protec-
tion clause.
217 1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 303-04, 396-97.
218 Id. at 395-96, 397.
219 334 U.S. 1, at 13. But see Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.
Ill. 1960), discussed in text accompanying note 241 infra.
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City Enforcement of Existing Housing Ordinances
The primary thrust of this article is the elimination of racial discrim-
ination and segregation in housing. But it is not intended to ignore the
basic need for decent housing, quite apart from racial considerations.
It is the absence of sufficient decent housing which creates the condi-
tions in which racial segregation is intensified and inequities occur when
minority groups seek new housing.
Experts have also documented the role of racial slums in drawing an
ugly stereotype of a minority group: "If people of a particular group
can live in such filth and squalor, then they must be filthy, sordid people.
I don't want them to move into my neighborhood."
Large areas in every metropolitan urban center have disintegrated
into slums. Many individual landlords have permitted their properties
to deteriorate below acceptable standards of habitable accommodations
while at the same time increasing their rental charges. This is partic-
ularly true in "ghettos" occupied by minority groups. One solution to
this problem has been the razing of whole communities and rebuilding
through Title I projects, discussed above. This solution however creates
many new problems since it does not increase the total number of decent
and habitable dwellings and it involves rather lengthy periods of dis-
location for many tenants and businesses.
How effectively can a city prevent deterioration of dwelling units
through enforcement of existing laws and thereby eradicate many slums
and minority group ghettos? No precise answer can be given. Perhaps
the solution in each instance will depend upon the intensity and the
nature of the problem in a given locality. However, it may be helpful to
list the emergency measures recently instituted by New York City.
Single-room-occupancy buildings. There are 755 such buildings in
New York City in which rooms are rented out separately in former
apartment houses. Approximately 47,000 families occupy these build-
ings.
Under existing ordinances, the City has instituted:
a. systematic inspection of all such buildings;
b. prosecution of owners for building violations;
c. action to reduce rents where services are not being provided.
The city has also enacted several ordinances forbidding families with
children under sixteen years of age to move into single rooms in single-
room-occupancy buildings or rooming houses, if the units do not have
separate bathroom and kitchen facilities. The ordinances make it illegal
for such families to continue to live in such units after January 1, 1965,
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and require tenants in such buildings to furnish their landlords with
affidavits listing their children under sixteen. Landlords are required
to furnish this information to the city, together with applications for
annual licenses. 2
20
In addition, the city is condemning those single-room-occupancy build-
ings which can be restored to apartment house use. Tenants who are pres-
ently occupying these single-room buildings and are ineligible for public
housing accommodations will be assisted by a social service program to
prepare them for relocation in other public accommodations. Upon
completion of this renovation program, the city will operate these ac-
commodations as public housing projects. 221
Tenements. The city magistrate courts during the emergency are
giving special precedence to cases involving violations of the health and
safety ordinances by tenement owners and managers. The state attorney
general has also instituted dissolution proceedings against several real es-
tate corporations, owners of tenements which repeatedly violated nu-
merous provisions of the health and safety ordinances.222 To aid in the
effectuation of this emergency program, the City Rent Commission has
ordered a 10 per cent reduction in rent charges in rodent-infested
units.122
University Sponsored Agreements Not to Discriminate in Student
Housing
A number of universities have recently adopted regulations prohibit-
ing racial and religious discrimination against students seeking housing
accommodations near the institutions. In New York, Washington and
Colorado,2 4 the programs are the result of cooperation with state com-
missions against discrimination operating under fair housing statutes.
Yale University225 and the University of California at Berkeley228 have
220 N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1960, p. 1, col. 2.
221 N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1960, p. 1, col. 1; Mar. 25, p. 12, col. 2. United Rooming
House Operators, Inc., was organized to oppose this plan. HHFA was asked to pay
two-thirds of the cost of restoration under the 1954 Housing Act.
In 1954, HHFA Administrator Cole estimated that at least two-thirds of the slum
families in most major cities are members of minority groups. U.S. Comm'n on Civil
Rights, supra note 2, at 144.
222 The program was delayed due to difficulty in determining the actual owners of
several of the tenements. $40,000 from a state emergency fund was provided to the
attorney general for untangling the corporate structures apparently intended to conceal
the facts of ownership. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1960, p. 1, col. 3. Receivership legislation
has been introduced in the state legislature to permit the city to take over temporarily
and make repairs on slum property which the landlord was unwilling to make or can
not make. See San Francisco attack on South-of-Market slums, S.F. Chronicle, Mar. 6,
1960. Cf. Sporn, "Some Contributions of the Income Tax Law to the Growth and
Prevalence of Slums." 59 Colum. L. Rev. 1026 (1960).
223 N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1960, p. 20, col. 2.
224 See, e.g., statement of Colo. Bd. of Regents, 5 Race Rel. L. Rep. 281 (1960).
225 N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1960, p. 8, col. 2.
226 S.F. Chronicle, Jan. 27, 1960.
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recently required landlords to sign pledge cards agreeing not to discrim-
inate "on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry."
Landlords refusing to sign will not be listed by the university housing
bureaus. The typical provision adopted to penalize violators of the
nondiscriminatory pledge is to remove their accommodations from the
university housing list after an administrative-type hearing and a finding
that the regulation has been violated. Somewhat similar regulations are
now in effect at many other universities throughout the country.2 7
Social fraternities and sororities, traditionally selective in choice of
members, have been forbidden on many campuses to use race, religion,
or national origin as standards for judging acceptability. Most univer-
sities have set a deadline for initiation of this nondiscriminatory prac-
tice.2 2
8
IV. INDIVIDUAL SELF-HELP AND COMMUNITY APPROACHES TO
INTEGRATION AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS
Reaction to Desegregation: Individual and Group Violence
Probably the most extreme reaction directed against contemplated
or actual integration of previously segregated residential communities
has been acts of violence and property destruction. Such incidents are
not limited to particular areas of the country, but have occurred from
Berkeley, California 229 to Hamilton Township, New Jersey2 30 Nor are
227 Trends in Housing, Nov.-Dec. 1959, p. 3. Other schools with similar regulations
include New Paltz State Teachers College, N.Y.; Harvard; Radcliffe; Univ. of Minn.;
Marquette Univ., Milwaukee.
122 Ohio State faculty members asked the University to ban racial discrimination in
off-campus housing in 1959, and the student senate voted for such action. In 1960, the
University announced that any licensed off-campus rooming house against which a charge
of discrimination has been proved will be dropped from the approved list. Trends in
Housing, July-Aug. 1960, p. 7.
228 Calif. Educ. Code §§ 954.6-954.9, prohibits state colleges from recognizing fraternities,
sororities or living groups, honor societies or other student organizations which restrict
membership on the basis of race, religion or national origin after Sept. 1, 1964. On May 27,
1960, U. of Pa. Trustees ordered three fraternities to end racial and religious discrimination in
selection of members. N.Y. Post, May 28, 1960.
229 S.F. Chronicle, Sept. 17, 1959, p. 14.
230 N.Y. Post, Aug. 18, 1960, p. 24. In Wilmington, Dela., a $13,500 home was virtually
destroyed by a bomb a few months after a Negro family moved into a previously all white
neighborhood. N.Y. Post, Aug. 9, 1959. Twenty-six incidents of violence directly connected
with attempts to sell, buy or occupy housing on a nonsegregated basis in southern states
are reported in American Friends Service Committee-National Council of Churches of
Christ-Southern Regional Council, Intimidation, Reprisal and Violence in the South's
Racial Crisis (1959). In Louisville, Ky., indictments for sedition, conspiracy and bomb-
throwing were brought against white friends of a Negro family who moved into a
previously all white neighborhood and had their home partially destroyed by a bomb.
One defendant was tried, but conviction was reversed on appeal; other defendants' indict-
ments were quashed. Kentucky v. Braden, 291 S.W.2d 843 (1956); Braden, The Wall
Between (1958).
In Chicago, Ill., there were 256 incidents of racial violence between 1956 and 1958,
including 134 attacks on persons, 122 attacks on property. Reports of Chicago Commission
on Human Relations, reprinted in 1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 854-5.
Recently four homes were bombed in one month in Chattanooga, including the home of
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these incidents limited to individual acts; often such violence and de-
struction were the product of group action.1
3
'
In many instances, of course, the state or locality has acted to put
down the violence and restore order. 32 On the other hand, there are
many instances in which the local constabulary either was unsuccessful
in its efforts to restore order or took a "hands-off" attitude towards the
controversy.33
Local law enforcement, however, is but one aspect of the problem of
maintenance of community order and tranquillity. Local public opinion
has played a major role. Where prevailing public sentiment has been
generally opposed to the reception of minority members in a previously
non-integrated community, violent and destructive conduct has occurred
repeatedly, but where the prevailing sentiment has been receptive to
open occupancy, violent and destructive reactions have been either
non-existent or limited and short-lived.
This disciplinary effect of local public sentiment has also influenced
the actions of members of minority groups seeking housing accommoda-
tions in communities previously closed to them. Where the sentiment
is favorable the tendency has been to seek accommodations; but where
the sentiment is generally opposed to open occupancy, the tendency
likewise has been to stay out. Similarly, the force of local sentiment has
affected the practices of members of the majority group.234
The causes and effects of prejudice and discrimination against mi-
a real estate agent whose company handles sales of homes to Negroes. N.Y. Times, Aug.
19, 1960. Rock-throwing at the Philadelphia home of a Negro family in a white neighbor-
hood brought a round-the-clock police guard. S.F. Chronicle, Mar. 28, 1960. A home was
bombed in Atlanta on Apr. 13, 1960, the first since the 1958 synagogue bombing. N.Y.
Post, Apr. 14, 1960. After winning a federal suit to prevent condemnation of their partially
built home by a water district, the Portland, Ore., home of a Negro couple in a white
neighborhood was damaged by fire July 4. N.Y. Times, July 5, 1960. See note 255
infra.
231 Most of the incidents described in note 230 involved group action.
232 When the first Negro family moved into Levittown, Pa. (see note 71), county
officials moved rapidly for an injunction to prohibit eight named residents of Levittown
from soliciting memberships in the Ku Klux Klan, burning crosses, distributing inflam-
matory literature and scurrilous pictures, setting off bombs and firecrackers, participating
in motorcades, and making threats directed at the Negro family. The court granted a
preliminary injunction and, after a three-day trial, made it permanent. No further
incidents occurred. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 3 Civ. Lib. Docket 18, 42, 3 Race Rel. L.
Rep. 49 (Bucks Co. Com. Pleas Ct. 1957).
Seventy incidents of harassment were listed by a Los Angeles Negro family in the 7
months after they moved into the white Pacoima section in 1959. After 500 patrols of the
residence, police caught one of the neighbors in a malevolent act, for which he was tried
and convicted by an all white jury in July, 1960. Trends in Housing, July-Aug. 1960,
p. 2.
233 E.g., in Atlanta, Ga., at least 12 houses were bombed in eight years, with no arrests
or convictions, according to testimony, 1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 556-7. For examples of
specific government action to prevent integrated housing, see notes 254 & 255 infra.
234 See, e.g., Commission on Race and Housing, Where Shall We Live 54-56 (1958).
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nority groups have been extensively studied and documented.2 35 One of
the major causes is fear of decline in property values in integrated
neighborhoods.2 36 Another primary cause as reflected by these studies
is the lack of communication between the majority and minority groups.
Where groups are isolated by such fictional barriers as race, creed or
religion, without opportunity for contact, unfounded stereotypes, un-
founded fears and hatred are fostered. But where there is a general
coming together, an opportunity is thus provided for intergroup com-
munication and understanding. 237
No doubt many of the incidents of violence, property destruction and
rejection are attributable to an absence of lines of communication be-
tween the majority group and the minority groups. These incidents are
but instances where unfounded stereotypes, fears and hatred were trans-
lated into overt acts.
Individual Lawsuits
The judicial machinery has also been utilized by members of minority
groups seeking housing accommodations in previously restricted resi-
dential areas. Generally, the problem concerned racial restrictive cove-
nants prohibiting sale to certain groups, or deeds containing forfeiture
provisions in the event property is sold to a purchaser who is a member
of a minority group. Such agreements and provisions have been uni-
formly denied enforcement under the equal protection clause.238 Sim-
ilarly, damages have been denied for breach of racial or religious res-
trictive agreements.239
A new twist has been added to the law of restrictive covenants by the
efforts of some private developers to plan "balanced" inter-racial com-
235 Id. at 10-34.
236 Laurenti, Property Values and Race (1960). This cause was mentioned explicitly in
the long, careful recital of the facts in Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681, at
706 (E.D. Ill. 1960):
Viewed from any angle, the attitude of some of the Village residents was deplorable-
based as it was on animosity and resentment at the prospect of having Negro neighbors.
It must be observed, however, that many of the Villagers who were the most aroused
and who raised the most commotion were animated by the telephoned offers to
purchase their homes at reduced prices. Most of these people have all of their life
savings invested in their homes and the prospect of losing that security was a
greater factor than the thought of Negro neighbors. Fear gripped the community
and fear is the very base and foundation of hate and intolerance.
237 Commission on Race and Housing, supra note 234, at 14-18, and see discussion of
experiences in multi-racial communities, infra at note 257.
238 Shelley v. Kraemer, supra note 16; Harris v. Sunset Islands Property Owners, Inc.,
4 Civ. Lib. Docket 109 (1959). Clouds on title to property covered by racial restrictive
covenants were removed as a result of suits by Negro purchasers in Robinson v. Mansfield,
2 Civ. Lib. Docket 81 (Super. Ct., Pima, Ariz. 1957); Smith v. Clark, 2 Civ. Lib. Docket
47 (D.C. Colo. 1956).
239 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Stratton v. Conway, 301 S.W.2d 332
(1957).
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munities by the use of "benign quotas. 12 4 ° When Modem Community
Developers bought land in an all-white Chicago suburb, it planned to
build 51 homes, 10 or 12 to be sold to Negroes and the rest to whites,
in order to open this suburb to Negro occupancy while insuring that the
particular development would not become segregated. When this plan
became known, the village held an election to condemn the land pur-
chased by Modern for park purposes, although two similar elections in the
previous year had ended in defeat for the park commission. When the
election returns authorized such condemnation, Modern sought injunc-
tive relief in the federal district court. A temporary restraining order
was granted, then dissolved after hearing, and injunctive relief was de-
nied on a finding that Modem intended to enforce integration in its
development by means of racial restrictive covenants. The developer
required that each purchaser, as a condition precedent to his purchase,
execute a separate resale agreement, which was not to be recorded. This
agreement gave the developer the exclusive right to select a purchaser
for the property in the event of a resale of the premises, and Modem
would resell to another person of the same race as the original pur-
chaser, and the initial integration ratio-alleged to be the same as that
in the population of Chicago-would thus be continued.
The court held:
26. The "controlled occupancy pattern" which the plaintiffs propose is
a racial discrimination and in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States and is unenforceable in
any court of law or equity in the United States.
27. [This pattern] ... is not protected by Sections 1981, 1982 and 1985,
Title 42 U.S.CA ....
28. The "controlled occupancy pattern" which the plaintiffs propose is
illegal and the plaintiffs do not come into a court of equity with clean
hands.
30. The "controlled occupancy pattern" and resale quota system which
Modern Community Developers, Inc., proposes to use in Deerfield . . .is
illegal both as to initial sales and resales. The power of a federal court
cannot be used consistently with the Fifth Amendment and the Civil Rights
Statutes to impose any percentage quota of Negro or Caucasians. Similarly,
State power and authority cannot be constitutionally employed within the
restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment to control either the original
or subsequent devolution of realty on a quota basis.
31. A party who plans to put into effect a system of land tenure whereby
ownership or occupation of land will be controlled on racial or other dis-
criminatory bases cannot seek damages in a federal court for any inter-
ference which prevents such party from putting such plan into effect.241
240 See Navasky, "The Benevolent Housing Quota," 6 How. LJ. 30 (1960).
241 Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681, at 712-13.
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The court conceded that the immediate effect of its ruling would be
to deny 10 or 12 Negro families the opportunity to live in Deerfield,
but argued that if this quota were held constitutional, "then a quota of
50 to 50 or 99 to 1 or even 100 to 0 would be constitutional and Shelley
v. Kraemer would be circumvented, 2 42  citing Hughes v. Superior
Court,243 in which a unanimous Supreme Court outlawed a compulsory
employment system which a group of Negroes sought to force on a Los
Angeles department store. In a practical sense, the court pointed out:
Had a plan, similar to the one sponsored by plaintiffs, been adopted in
Chicago twenty years ago-when the Negro population was nearer to 10
than to 20 per cent of the whole-today's Negro population of that city
would be hard put to find homes there.2 44
The bind on the willing Negro home buyer in Chicago has been
moving New York audiences nightly in "Raisin in the Sun. 24 5 It has
also been moving Negro purchasers into the Chicago courts to reform
contracts of sale based on inflated and extravagant sales prices. Because
of the acknowledged limitations of the market of available housing
accommodations for Negroes, courts have granted relief against some
white speculators who bought property at low prices, then sold it to
Negro purchasers at greatly inflated prices.248
In at least one instance, disciplinary action has been brought against
a realtor who negotiated a sale of a home to a Mexican-American family
in a previously restricted neighborhood. The realtor was ousted from
membership in the local realty board and fined. The realtor refused to
pay the fine and sued the local board for damages, charging that it had
violated the state law prohibiting unfair interference with trade and
competition. The court dismissed the complaint, holding that the board
acted in good faith.24 ' Two Baltimore brokers had their licenses sus-
242 Id. at 707.
243 339 U.S. 460 (1950), quoting from Calif. Sup. Ct. opinion at 32 Cal. 2d 850, 856, 198
P.2d 885, 888 (1948).
244 182 F. Supp., at 709. Plaintiff's appeal is pending in the Court of Appeals.
245 By Lorraine Hansbury.
246 See, e.g., instance in which white purchaser bought a home for $4,000, immediately
sold it to a Negro for $13,900 on contract. The Negro family paid $1,400, then defaulted;
the seller brought eviction proceedings. The buyer, in turn, sued to have the contract
reformed, to restrain the seller from continuing the eviction proceedings, to disclose all of
the circumstances in connection with seller's purchase of the property, and to restrain seller
from making further sales of similar properties. The court stayed eviction proceedings and
the case was ultimately settled out of court. Bolton v. Crane, Civil No. 57 § 6577, Cook
Co. Super. Ct., 4 Civ. Lib. Docket 35, May 1957; correspondence with counsel, Mark J.
Satter, Chicago, Oct. 27, 1959. See News Notes, Greater Lawndale Conservation Com-
mission, July 23, 1958; Satter, "Land Contract Sales in Chicago: Security Turned
Exploitation," Chicago B. Rec., March 1958.
247 Beddoe v. Southeast Realty Bd., Civil No. $6C 1050, Calif. Super. Ct., Los
Angeles, Dec. 1955, 2 Civ. Lib. Docket 27, 81, 3 Civ. Lib. Docket 62. In McGregor v.
Florida Real Estate Comm., 99 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1958), the court affirmed action by the
commission against an agent who accepted a listing of property restricted in sale to
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pended by the Maryland Real Estate Commission. The -brokers sued,
contending that the complaints charging them with unethical miscon-
duct were actually based on their handling purchases of residential
properties by Negroes in previously all-white neighborhoods, but the
state court of appeals affirmed the suspensions.248
In Ming v. Horgan,249 discussed above, a prospective Negro purchaser
sought declaratory relief in a class action 50 brought on behalf of all
prospective Negro purchasers against the discriminatory sales practices
of realtors and developers of all publicly assisted tract home develop-
ments in the area. In granting the requested relief, the court held that
the regulation of the realtors and developers by the state and the reg-
ulation of construction standards under the federal housing program
provided a sufficient basis for requiring the realtors and developers to
sell without regard to race or color.
While in the Ming case the court was only concerned with declaring
the rights of the parties, subsequent similar suits have requested other
forms of relief such as damages251 and have obtained temporary res-
training orders requiring defendants to hold the property in controversy,
pending outcome of the suit.25 2 In July, 1960, a California court held,
for the first time, that a Negro couple denied rental housing accom-
modations because of race was entitled to one thousand dollars dam-
ages under the two new California code sections discussed above.253
Christians and then negotiated sale to a Jewish purchaser. The court upheld the action as
one to punish the agent for breach of a confidential relationship and not one to enforce
a discriminatory contract.
248 Bernstein v. Real Estate Comm'n, 221 Md. 221, 156 A.2d 657 (1960).
249 Supra note 70.
250 The suit was not allowed as a class action due to a procedural defect. The court,
however, admitted evidence of discriminatory practices against other Negroes by the
defendants.
Some indication of the paucity of new housing for minority group members in metro-
politan areas can be seen from the following FHA figures for 1950 through 1956 on
occupancy of all newly constructed private units in the areas listed:
White Nonwhite
Boston 99.8% 0.2%
New York 99.4% 0.6%
Philadelphia 99.3% 0.7%
Detroit 98.6% 1.4%
Chicago 96.6% 3.4%
Los Angeles 98.1% 1.9%
Seattle 99.2% 0.8%
Dallas 97.3% 2.7%
Atlanta 85.4% 14.6 %
FHA, Trends in Occupied Dwelling Units (1959).
For discussion of special agreements in Atlanta, see 1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 441-53,
but cf. id. at 587, 556-57.
251 Gerrish v. Shattuck, supra note 129.
252 Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., supra note 129; Pearson v. Frumenti, supra note 127.
253 Hudson v. Nixon, Civil No. 28219, Calif. Super. Ct. Merced County, 5 Civ. Lib.
Docket 96, July 28, 1960. See text at note 129 supra.
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In some instances city officials have appeared to enforce valid build-
ing standards in such a manner as to frustrate the efforts of Negro home
owners to improve their property in a marginal area slated for razing
and replacement by a segregated white housing development, and efforts
of Negro builders to further upgrade the area through new construction.
Court relief has been sought and sometimes granted against such official
action. 54 Suits are pending in Missouri, Illinois and Oregon to test
validity of condemnation proceedings instituted against pieces of prop-
erty on which Negroes had begun building homes in previously all-white
sections. 55
Group Action to Maintain Desirable Integrated Communities
Today, in many northern and western cities, there are residential com-
munities composed of members of various racial, religious and national
groups. The composition of these communities is by no means a hap-
penstance; rather it is the end product of the efforts of realtors on the
one hand, and voluntary private groups on the other. Realtors have
generally opposed initiating sales of housing to members of a minority
group in a previously exclusive neighborhood. 56 After the breakthrough,
the same realtors generally refuse to rent to members of the majority
group and actively discourage white tenants from remaining in the area.
This technique is not employed for altruistic reasons, i.e., to provide
additional housing accommodations for members of minority groups who
enjoy at most a limited market in which to seek accommodations.
Rather, it is the modus operandi for capitalizing on a situation brought
about by the socio-economic problem extant in the housing field. By
making housing accommodations available to members of minority
groups who are limited in their choice in the general market, these
realtors can and do provide the accommodations at inflated prices and
with reduced services.
In several of these multi-racial neighborhoods, private organizations,
254 In Carmichael v. Christenson, Civil No. 57 § 17586, Cook Co. Super. Ct., 4 Civ.
Lib. Docket 35, Nov. 1958, plaintiff Negro builder alleged that city officials refused to
provide water and required occupancy permits before allowing purchaser to move into a
substantially completed house. The city argued the house was not completed according
to plans and specifications. Correspondence with counsel, Sherwin Willens, Chicago, Oct. 27,
1959.
A white seller in N.J. was charged with violating an unused housing code section for
failing to obtain a health department certificate at the time of transfer, and the Negro
buyer was temporarily denied access to the home on this ground. Re Visconti, 5 Civ. Lib.
Docket 96 (1960).
255 City of Creve Coeur v. Dielman, 5 Civ. Lib. Docket 96 (1960); Missouri ex rel.
City of Creve Coeur v. Weinstein, 5 Civ. Lib. Docket 96 (1960); Progress Dev. Corp.
v. Mitchell, supra note 241, pending in Court of Appeals; Wiley v. Richland Water Dist.,
5 Civ. Lib. Docket 96 (D.C. Ore. 1960).
256 See text accompanying notes 204-05 supra.
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local merchants and community leaders have sought to retain the inter-
racial character of the changing neighborhoods, believing integration
to be a social good.257 The political and community leaders are also
motivated by the knowledge that widespread migration disrupts citizen
participation in government and in the operation of .charitable and other
community services, whereas a stable community promotes these social
values.
In the main, community groups have followed a common pattern
and approach. Their primary activities are usually listed as:
1. Neighborhood improvement: "clean up, fix up" projects, street
repairs, improved street lighting, investigation of fire, sanitary, zoning
and building code violations, attention to the problem of unsupervised
children, opposition to increasing the number of liquor licenses issued
in the area.
2. Stabilization of existing population: formation and guidance of a
network of block associations, and extensive cooperation with various
religious organizations.
3. Neighborhood promotion: newspaper advertisements and distribu-
tion of brochures stressing the advantages, convenience and services in
the area. (Local businessmen often underwrite the expense of such
campaigns.)
4. Intergroup relations: community institutes and conferences in-
volving the total community, schools and religious institutions concern-
ing the need for and desirability of balanced, stable communities.
5. Elimination of undesirable real estate practices: banning of real
estate listings by race,258 banning of "sold" signs where used to create
257 E.g., in Hyde Park-Kenwood section of Chicago, the Southeast Chicago Com-
mission, in existence seven years, has achieved considerable success, recounted in Abrahamson,
A Neighborhood Finds Itself (1959). In north Washington, D.C., the Neighbors, Inc., in
existence about a year, employs a full-time executive secretary. Eight neighborhood groups
are working in cooperation with the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations.
Trends in Housing, Sept.-Oct. 1959, p. 8. In the western section of St. Louis, the West
End Community Conference, in existence five years, has sought to stabilize the population
of this border city. Southern School News, Jan. 1960, pp. 10-11. Anti-slum groups are in
process of development in the Rockaways area, New York City (N.Y. Times, Jan. 8,
1960, p. 9, col. 5) and in the Mission area of San Francisco (S.F. Chronicle, Oct. 20,
1959). The Cleveland Foundation has made a grant to Ludlow Community Association to
preserve the Shaker Heights area in Cleveland, in which 80 or 90 Negro families and 500
white families live in $20,000-$50,000 homes. N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1959. And see
Millspaugh & Breckenfeld, The Human of Urban Renewal-A Study of Attitude Changes
Produced by Neighborhood Rehabilitation (1958). Work in Springfield Gardens, Rosedale
and Laurelton, Queens, New York, is described in 1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 218-23. The
National Conference of Christians and Jews has assisted community groups in changing
neighborhoods in the Reservoir Hill-Burroughs school area of Tulsa (Southern School
News, Dec. 1959, p. 7) and Oklahoma City (Southern School News, Jan. 1960, p. 8).
258 Neighbors, Inc., and the American Veterans Committee in Washington, D.C.,
obtained 2500 signatures in a petition drive against Washington newspapers' practice of
listing real estate under racial designations. In August 1960, the three Washington dailies
dropped the designation "colored" from houses for sale ads. H.R. 9209, 86th Cong.,
introduced in 1959, would prohibit this practice.
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the impression of great (racial) turnover, 259 and feature stories in the
press revealing tactics of unethical real estate operators to stimulate
panic selling.260
While majority and minority group members in the changing areas
desire to keep its integrated character, this objective has only been
achieved to the extent that majority group families have been attracted
to the community through the efforts of realtors working with com-
munity groups2 6 1
These groups have also recognized that the public school can serve
as a focus for community concern and cooperative efforts. Education in
intergroup relations frequently starts in the local parent-teacher as-
sociations. Parents are also particularly sensitive to the fact that the
quality of public education is one of the decisive factors in home selec-
tion. Where schools have maintained high standards, efforts to main-
tain multi-racial, stabilized communities have been more successful. But
where boards of education have failed to retain experienced teachers,
or have distorted the areas' racial patterns in drawing school zoning
lines,262 schools have become substandard. Not only do desirable pro-
spective occupants then avoid the community, but those who reside in
the community seek to get out.
New York City, however, has recently taken a step in exactly the
opposite direction. The Parents Workshop for Equality in New York
City Schools became convinced that integration in housing will be
too slow in the nation's largest city to effectuate integration in public
schools naturally, despite city and state fair housing legislation. The
Workshop threatened a sit-out September 12, 1960, unless the Board of
Education issued a "plan and timetable for the desegregation of the
public schools" and for "immediate voluntary transfers" to parents
wishing their children to attend integrated schools2 63 On August 31,
1960, the Board announced such a voluntary transfer plan, applicable
at first to students attending 21 junior high and 2 senior high schools,
and later to students in 16 elementary schools. Students of any race
attending the "sending" schools-chosen because of their high con-
259 Neighbors, Inc., found such signs illegal in the District though commonly used. See
Caplan, "Last White Family on the Block," Atlantic Monthly, July 1960, p. 54.
260 Trends in Housing, Sept.-Oct. 1959, p. 8.
261 Ibid.
262 E.g., parents in Crown Heights section of Brooklyn, New York, charged that
school zoning lines were redrawn in such a manner that the percentage of Negro children
in two area schools was much higher than the percentage of Negro persons in the area
population, while other schools in the area had a much smaller percentage of Negro
children than the percentage of Negro persons in the area generally. Crown Heights is a
racially changing neighborhood consisting primarily of rental units. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6,
1959, p. 16, col. 1.
263 National Guardian, Sept. 5, 1960.
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centration of Negro and Puerto Rican pupils and their overcrowded
condition-are permitted to transfer to "receiving" schools-chosen
because of their under-utilization. The percentage of minority group
members in the "receiving" schools had been low before the transfers. 64
The Board plan requires parents to provide transportation for their
children to the "receiving" schools, often some distance from the pupils'
homes. Three hundred and ninety-three junior and senior high students
transferred under the plan, and 284 third to fifth graders, although it
had been estimated that several thousand would apply. 65 One reason
given for the small number of transfers is the expense and difficulty of
parents providing transportation to the new schools. There is also fear
of the rootlessness which may result when children leave their own
neighborhoods to attend school with one group of children, only to
return to their neighborhood friends in the evening. Certainly the plan
poses serious problems in terms of parent participation in parent-teacher
associations in the non-neighborhood schools. While some immediate
answer had to be found to the segregated and unequal education offered
to most of New York's colored students, this plan does nothing to alle-
viate the fear of further erosion of the concept of neighborhood in
our largest metropolis, with its concomitant lack of community concern
for the deterioration of housing and government services. Its effect on
the expansion of integrated housing areas remains to be seen.
State and local commissions established to administer fair housing
laws have, where empowered to do so, conducted educational campaigns,
thus creating a receptive and favorable attitude for fair housing practices
in the affected communities.266 But some commissions, when called upon
by local community organizations, have failed to provide the kind of
decisive leadership necessary to preserve these communities. 67 It seems
clear that the most hopeful situation exists in multi-racial communities
having natural geographical advantages, housing accommodations of
various sizes to permit movement within the community as families
increase in size, and with a high percentage of home ownership and
investment in the community. However, rental areas can also profit from
governmental assistance to retain living standards generally, as well as
264 N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1960, pp. 1, 15, cols. 4, 3; id., editorial, p. 26.
265 N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1960.
266 See, e.g., work of COIR in Queens, described in 1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 218-23.
And see Phila. Comm'n on Human Relations, "What To Do Kit," "Your Next Move,"(1960).
267 Some fair housing commissions have indicated that their limited staffs permit
attention to only three areas: (1) education of the public concerning the fair housing
laws; (2) processing of specific complaints of unfair housing practices; (3) opening of
additional housing to members of minority groups, through education and enforcement
campaigns.
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to prevent panic moving and inflated rentals. It would appear that
constructive work by fair housing commissions can help delay or
prevent the creation of additional segregated urban areas which, typi-
cally, are permitted to deteriorate into segregated slums.2 68
Building New Integrated Communities
In recent years, a number of housing developments have been built
as racially integrated communities. The developers intended from the
beginning that the population would consist of multi-racial, ethnic and
religious groups. The early projects had great difficulty in securing
financing through ordinary channels, but many lending institutions now
accept these planned interracial projects as good financial risks2 69 The
developers established quotas of racial occupancy in order to prevent
the areas from becoming segregated. Modern Community Developers,
Inc., was the first corporation formed expressly for the purpose of
advancing integrated communities.7 0 It has established several integrated
communities in Pennsylvania and New Jersey,27 1 and plans to construct
an integrated community in Deerfield Village, Illinois.
272
As a wholly private endeavor, such activity may be both desirable
and helpful. To be sure, it makes available on a limited scale decent,
nonsegregated housing accommodations. But if public funds or assistance
are involved, its constitutionality would be questionable. As has been
seen, racial quota systems in public housing have been held unconstitu-
tional.273 This method of tenant selection contravenes the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. By utilizing quotas based
on race or religion in tenant selection the developer in effect either
postpones the right to accommodations of those exceeding the determined
quota percentile, or excludes them entirely. Hence, where such a program
in operation and effect denies constitutionally protected rights, its sanc-
268 See description of specific community housekeeping problems which arise in such
neighborhoods, in Abrahamson, supra note 257, in Appendix.
269 See, e.g., 1 Hearings, supra note 3, at 31; Shapiro, "Integrated Housing: Its Extent
and Acceptance," 18 Law. Guild Rev. 12-19 (1958). The UAW-CIO-AFL sponsored an
open occupancy project in Milpitas, California, near the site of a new Ford Motor Co.
plant. The 152-house project was sufficiently successful to encourage the builders to plan
270 more homes in the development, ranging from $12,750 to $13,750. S.F. Chronicle, July
12, 1960.
270 U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 2, at 178. And note Spring Hill Gardens,
new open occupancy development in Pittsburgh, Pa., described in Trends in Housing,
Mar-Apr., 1960, p. 8.
271 Modem Community Developers have built and sold 139 $12,-$15,000 homes at
Trevose, Pa., 55% white, 45% Negro; 19 $20,-$45,000 homes in Philadelphia, 66% white;
39 $18,-$42,000 homes in Princeton, New Jersey, 75% white. It is engaged in constructing
101 $16,-$19,000 homes in Waterbury, Conn.
272 See discussion of Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell accompanying note 241 supra.
273 See text accompahying note 29 supra.
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tion as a governmental program would run counter to equal protection
interdictions against government, even if the racial quota is intended by
its initiators to be "benign."
Such a program would also run counter to equal protection interdictions
against government when, as in the Deerfield case, no federal funds or
insurance were involved, but rather injunctive relief was sought from the
judicial arm. Such relief can not be granted to a private corporation
seeking to enforce integrated housing by means of racial restrictive
covenants, even when the attack upon the corporation is made by a
city government motivated by undemocratic, anti-Negro sentiments.
A less "benevolent" approach to integration in housing may prove
more successful than the rigid percentage planning of the Community
Developers. For example, an increased vacancy rate disturbed the
management of Chatham Park Village, a- twenty-year old Chicago
apartment community of 62 town-house style buildings containing 554
units and 2700 white residents, paying $98 to $132 monthly rentals.
Management notified all tenants that: "Effective Nov. 1, 1959, appli-
cants for vacancies in the Village will be screened and selected
with the objective of creating a high-grade, racially-integrated com-
munity . . ." Management simultaneously made a number of improve-
ments: automatic washers and dryers were installed in all buildings;
increased decorating allowances were put into effect; management
provided increased police patrols on quiet, electric vehicles, and super-
vised a new well-equipped play area. Although 200 white residents
moved out when the first Negro family moved in, and a reputable
real estate firm circulated a letter encouraging other residents to
move out, a Village Council was organized to squelch rumors and
began organizing along the lines of other community groups described
above. White families continued to move into the Village as well as
Negro families. 4
On a limited scale, at least eighteen organizations in nine northern and
western states are working to find nondiscriminatory housing for members
of minority groups. 7 5 One common technique is the establishment of a
"listing service" or "fair housing registry" to provide a free service for
sellers and landlords interested in selling or renting nondiscriminatorily,
and for buyers and tenants seeking housing in areas previously restricted,
in whole or in part. This approach has proved effective to some degree,
especially in areas covered by some type of fair housing legislation.
274 Trends in Housing, May-June 1960, pp. 7, 8.
275 See list in Trends in Housing, Sept.-Oct. 1959, pp. 4-6.
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CONCLUSION
C[A] decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family" is the stated goal of the United States. This goal
requires the construction of much new housing, and the enforcement of
existing health and housing standards. But merely to build new housing
and to prevent the deterioration of existing housing will not solve, or
even arrest the problem; what is needed is not only new and decent
housing, but accommodations available to all Americans on a nondis-
criminatory basis.
Specific and immediate attention must be given to America's minority
groups, whose housing needs have long been acute and have as long been
virtually ignored. The opportunities for rapid amelioration, if not solu-
tion, of the problem are great: (1) Housing today is being constructed
and renovated to a considerable degree with governmental assistance, and
this assistance must be undertaken under the constitutional principle
that housing financed, insured, or otherwise aided by the federal, state
or local governments, must be provided on a nondiscriminatory basis.
(2) Many private builders today have found that nondiscriminatory
housing is financially feasible and socially desirable, and are therefore
prepared to build and sell without discrimination.
The enactment of fair housing legislation has proved to be a consti-
tutional and effective method of discouraging customary discriminatory
practices and of encouraging nonsegregated housing. Community action
has also proved to be an effective approach toward establishing and main-
taining stable, nonsegregated communities, particularly where it has
caused the reversal of a policy of governmental unconcern and inaction.
The greatest progress toward the national goal has been made where
community organizations and governmental units have attempted bold,
imaginative and continuously forceful administration of existing laws
while educating citizens, realtors and lending institutions on the need
for new legislation to provide decent housing for all without regard
to race, national origin, or religion.
If we still must flinch when America is defined as "The house I live
in," the means for changing this reaction are at hand.
19611
